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Legal Analysis, Policy Analysis, and the Price of
Deference: An Empirical Study of Mayo and

Chevron

Jonathan H. Choi†

A huge literature contemplates the theoretical relationship between judicial
deference and agency rulemaking. But relatively little empirical work has studied
the actual effect of deference on how agencies draft regulations. As a result, some
of the most important questions surrounding deference—whether it encourages
agencies to focus on policy analysis instead of legal analysis, its relationship to
procedures like notice and comment—have so far been dominated by conjecture
and anecdote.
Because Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
applied simultaneously across agencies, it has been difficult to separate its specific
causal effect from other contemporaneous events in the 1980s, like the rise of costbenefit analysis and the new textualism. This Article contends with this problem
by exploiting a unique event in administrative law: the Supreme Court’s 2011
decision in Mayo Foundation v. United States, which required that courts apply
Chevron deference to interpretative tax regulations. By altering the deference
regime applicable to one specific category of regulation, Mayo created a natural
experiment with a treatment group (interpretative tax regulations) and a control
group (all other regulations).
This Article uses natural language processing and various statistical methods
to evaluate the causal effect of Chevron deference. These techniques allow the
Article to analyze a dataset of 69,956 regulations in a transparent and replicable
manner. The Article finds that, after Mayo, the Department of the Treasury
shifted its explanations for new tax rules to focus more on normative policy
concerns and less on statutory interpretation. These results are statistically
significant and large in magnitude: a 137.3% increase in language discussing
†
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normative goals (like efficiency and fairness) and a 48.5% decrease in language
discussing the underlying statute.
In addition, the Article introduces a new theoretical model in which greater
judicial deference encourages agencies to exert more effort in following
rulemaking procedures. It hypothesizes that agencies counterintuitively view
greater procedural effort as the “price” of judicial deference, a price that is more
worth paying when courts are more deferential. Empirical analysis supports this
hypothesis, finding that the move to Chevron deference caused a 18.9% increase
in the length of regulatory preambles and a 35.8% increase in the intensity of
preambles’ discussion of public comments.
These results cast new light on the debate over Chevron, suggesting that
Chevron makes agency rulemaking more detailed and policy-focused. This raises
the stakes of a potential Chevron reversal and clarifies the arguments of its
supporters and critics. Ultimately, this Article underscores the importance of
judicial deference regimes in shaping agency behavior.
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Introduction

Chevron1 deference is under attack. Although Chevron is the most-cited
administrative law case of all time2 and one of the most important Supreme Court
cases of any kind,3 judges,4 legislators,5 and scholars.6 over the past decade have
increasingly called for its reversal. The appointments of Chevron-skeptical
1.
2.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking
Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 475 (2014).
3.
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006) (describing Chevron as “the most-cited case in
modern public law”).
4.
See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (“[I]t seems necessary and appropriate to
reconsider, in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that
decision.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2129 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In recent years, several Members of
this Court have questioned Chevron’s foundations.”); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (“Chevron deference raises serious separation-of-powers questions.”); Gutierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (describing Chevron as “a judge-made
doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty”); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Book Review, Fixing Statutory
Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2154 (2016) (criticizing Chevron as “indeterminate” and “antithetical
to the neutral, impartial rule of law”).
5.
Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, S. 2724, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016) (proposing to repeal
deference by requiring courts to “decide de novo all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation of
constitutional and statutory provisions, and rules made by agencies”); Separation of Powers Restoration Act of
2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016) (same).
6.
See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 316 (2014) (“[T]he
deference to [administrative] interpretation is an abandonment of judicial office . . . .”); Jack M. Beermann, End
the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42
CONN. L. REV. 779 (2010). Many other scholars have observed, but not necessarily encouraged, the decline of
Chevron. Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (2015)
(“[R]eports of Chevron’s death seemed to get significant confirmation at the end of the Supreme Court’s 20142015 Term . . . .”); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Without Chevron, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 60 (“It seems clear that
Chevron is entering a period of serious reconsideration. In the fullness of time, it might be seriously qualified or
even abandoned.”); Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59
ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 727 (2007) (describing “Chevron’s demise”).
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Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court have inspired fresh
arguments about judicial deference in general and Chevron deference in
particular.
But despite the enormous volume of scholarly literature on Chevron,7 almost
no empirical work has studied the effect of Chevron on agencies themselves. The
only study so far to address this question—Christopher Walker’s survey of agency
rule drafters—was inconclusive,8 leaving judges and policymakers in the dark
about Chevron’s actual effects.
One common critique of Chevron is that it encourages “executive
bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power.”9
More specifically, critics like Justice Thomas argue that it empowers agencies “not
to find the best meaning of the text, but to formulate legally binding rules to fill
in gaps based on policy judgments made by the agency rather than Congress.”10
This view is shared by many scholars, both critics and supporters of Chevron.11
They believe that Chevron dramatically transformed agency rulemaking, from the
province of lawyers seeking the most accurate reading of the statute into the
province of technocratic agency experts seeking the normatively best policy.12 Yet
this view has been supported so far primarily by anecdote rather than empirical
evidence.13
Another area that has received relatively little attention has been the
relationship between Chevron deference and the requirements of procedural
rulemaking, particularly agencies’ responsibilities to conduct notice and comment
and adequately explain new regulations to the public. These procedures play a
key role in administrative law—they are thought to increase public engagement,
democratic accountability, agency legitimacy, the diversity of views considered in

7.
Jerry Mashaw once joked that scholars have spilled so much ink over Chevron that it should have
been issued with its own environmental impact statement. JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 222 n.19 (1997).
8.
Infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
9.
Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1149-58 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron and Brand X permit
executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal
power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution . . . .”).
10.
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2713 (Thomas, J., concurring).
11.
Infra Section I.A.
12.
E.g., E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of
Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 12 (2005) (“Chevron opened up
and validated a policy making dialogue within agencies about what interpretation the agency should adopt for
policy reasons, rather than what interpretation the agency must adopt for legal reasons. . . . Chevron has
increased the weight given to the views of air pollution experts in the air program office relative to the lawyers
in OGC.”).
13.
Kavanaugh, supra note 4, at 2150 (“From my more than five years of experience at the White
House, I can confidently say that Chevron encourages the Executive Branch (whichever party controls it) to be
extremely aggressive in seeking to squeeze its policy goals into ill-fitting statutory authorizations and
restraints.”); David S. Tatel, The Administrative Process and the Rule of Environmental Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (“[I]t looks for all the world like agencies choose their policy first and then later seek to
defend its legality.”); Elliott, supra note 12, at 11-12.
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the regulatory process, and the quality of the regulation ultimately produced.14
But scholars have not yet studied Chevron’s role in this process. In theory,
Chevron is a doctrine of statutory interpretation entirely separate from
rulemaking procedures, which are dictated by State Farm15 and section 553(c) of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).16 Chevron therefore might have no
effect on agency rulemaking efforts, or it might even discourage agencies from
detailed compliance by making it less likely that courts will scrutinize agency
rulemaking at all.
This Article argues that, counterintuitively, Chevron should encourage
agencies to exert more effort in complying with rulemaking procedures, rather
than less. This is because agencies will view procedural effort as essentially the
price of judicial deference—even if Chevron and rulemaking requirements are
theoretically separate, investment in procedural compliance is more worthwhile
if the resulting regulation will receive more deferential review. This Article
presents a new theoretical model that supports this hypothesis.17 It also argues
that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has further strengthened the link
between Chevron deference and notice and comment requirements.18
On the other hand, many scholars and judges have argued that Chevron’s
influence is overstated. Some have alleged that Chevron is no more deferential
than its alternatives: Justice Breyer and former Judge Posner have argued that
Chevron deference is similar to Skidmore deference,19 while others have argued
that Chevron’s analysis of reasonableness is indistinguishable from the “arbitrary
and capricious” analysis required under the APA, independent of Chevron.20
Moreover, many scholars have empirically found that courts invoke Chevron less
often than is commonly supposed, and that its influence is minimal even when
invoked.21 All these perspectives suggest that Chevron might have little or no
effect—that it might inspire no shift toward a policy focus and might inspire no
additional procedural effort by agencies.
The essential problem in conducting causal analysis of Chevron has been the
absence of a control group. Because, in theory, Chevron applied to all agencies at
once, we cannot see how agency rulemaking would have developed
counterfactually. This has made it difficult to separate the effect of Chevron
14.
E.g., Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking,
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 968-69 (2009) (“In administrative law, the notice-and-comment process serves several
related functions: providing information to decisionmakers, legitimating the decisionmaking process, and
constraining decisionmakers by pushing them to confront arguments that point away from their preferred course
of action.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolving Relationship
Between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 130 (2015) (describing
the belief that notice and comment enhances political accountability of agencies as an “obsession” among
administrative law scholars).
15.
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
16.
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018).
17.
Infra Section I.B; Appendix Section A.
18.
Infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
19.
Infra note 78 and accompanying text.
20.
Infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
21.
Infra Section I.C.
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specifically from contemporaneous events in the mid-1980s, like the rise of costbenefit analysis,22 law and economics,23 and the new textualism.24
To address this problem, this Article proposes novel treatment and control
groups: the IRS and other federal agencies. Courts have historically accorded a
unique, lower degree of deference (National Muffler deference25) to
“interpretative tax regulations” promulgated under Treasury’s general power to
make tax regulations.26 This changed in 2011, when the Supreme Court ruled in
Mayo Foundation v. United States27 that all tax regulations are subject to
Chevron deference, including interpretative regulations.28 Mayo marked a huge
shift in administrative tax law, but notably it marked a shift only in tax law, since
regulations issued by other agencies had long been accorded Chevron deference.
This Article assembles a dataset comprising all the regulations digitally
available on FederalRegister.Gov, an official governmental source of federal
regulations from 2000 to the present. It algorithmically analyzes 69,956 discrete
agency rules during that period, issued by every federal agency, quantifying
various aspects of the regulatory preambles used to explain new regulations. It
evaluates the relative importance of legal analysis and policy analysis by analyzing
how frequently agencies discuss the relevant statute (reflecting a legal
orientation) versus normative considerations like fairness and efficiency
(reflecting a policy orientation). And it measures the effect of Chevron on
agencies’ procedural effort by examining changes to the length of preambles and
the frequency with which preambles discuss public comments. By quantifying text
in this way, the Article facilitates both visual examination of trends and more
complex statistical analysis.
The Article finds some evidence that the shift to Chevron deference caused
the IRS to become more focused on policy issues and less focused on legal issues,
and to exert greater procedural effort. Estimates of these effects are large in
magnitude and statistically significant: a 137.3% increase in the frequency of
normative terms, a 48.5% decrease in the frequency of statutory terms, a 18.9%
increase in preamble length, and a 35.8% increase in the intensity of discussion of
public comments.
Moreover, the Article investigates these results along multiple dimensions.
Mayo made preambles to interpretative tax regulations more likely to use any
normative terms at all and less likely to use any statutory terms at all. In addition,
among interpretative tax preambles that discussed normative concepts (or
statutory concepts), Mayo increased the intensity of use by increasing the
22.
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
23.
E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983).
24.
Most prominently, Justice Scalia was appointed in 1986 and quickly became a prominent new
textualist on the modern Court.
25.
Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
26.
Infra Section I.D.
27.
562 U.S. 44 (2011).
28.
Infra Section I.D.
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frequency of normative terms (and decreasing the frequency of statutory terms)
within each preamble. In contrast, Mayo did not significantly increase the
likelihood that a preamble referred to public comments at all; but among
preambles referring to public comments, Mayo substantially increased the
frequency of those references. The specific form of statistical analysis used in this
Article therefore allows more sophisticated analysis of Mayo’s effects.
These results suggest that Chevron has a substantial impact on agency
rulemaking. They sharpen the positions of Chevron’s critics and supporters,
underscoring the importance of Chevron and raising the stakes of the current
debate over judicial deference. They also add to the literature on tax
exceptionalism by illustrating how tax law’s unique deference regime prior to
Mayo influenced Treasury’s approach to drafting regulations.
This Article makes three main contributions to the existing literature on the
effects of Chevron. First, it empirically supports claims that Chevron pushes
agencies away from legal questions and toward policy ones. Second, it proposes a
new theoretical model under which Chevron deference increases agencies’
compliance with rulemaking procedures, because those procedures serve as the
price of heightened deference. Third, it empirically supports the price-ofdeference model, finding that Chevron deference does in fact increase the length
of regulatory preambles and the extent to which agencies engage with public
comments.
Part II discusses the history of and scholarly views on judicial deference and
introduces the price-of-deference model. Part III describes the empirical methods
used in this Article, and Part IV presents empirical results. Part V describes
specification checks that largely support the results in Part IV but that also raise
some notes of caution, especially with respect to the analysis of preamble length.
Part VI concludes by discussing the implications of this Article’s findings. The
Appendix provides additional detail on mathematical proofs, data, and methods.
I. Chevron, National Muffler, and Rulemaking Style

A. Rulemaking as Policymaking Rather than Legal Interpretation
When an administrative agency issues regulations, does it make a legal
judgment or a policy judgment?29 Does it look to evidence of statutory meaning—

29.
Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2365
(2018) (contrasting “legal” and “policy” rationales for rulemaking); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron:
Emphasizing Reasoned Decision-Making in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83,
88-90 (1994) (phrasing the choice as between a “formalist or transmission-belt model” under which
“administrative agencies expediently implement the will of the legislature” and an “expertise model” which
“emphasizes the experience and technical knowledge of agencies and their staffs”).
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statutory text and purpose, the intent of Congress30—or does it ask which rule is
normatively best, regardless of the statute?31
Chevron seemed to nudge agencies away from a statutory, legal orientation,
and toward a normative, policy one. The Court held that courts must defer to an
agency rule so long as the underlying statute is “silent or ambiguous” and the rule
reflects a “reasonable policy choice.”32 The Court’s decision in Chevron explicitly
noted that “an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”33
Donald Elliott, a former Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) lawyer,
recounts that prior to Chevron, the EPA had treated each statute as a
“prescriptive text having a single meaning, discoverable by specialized legal
training and tools.”34 After Chevron, the EPA treated statutes as creating “a
range of permissible interpretive discretion,” within which “[t]he agency’s policymakers, not its lawyers, should decide which of several different but legally
defensible interpretations to adopt.”35
In the statutory interpretation literature, the pre-Chevron approach is
sometimes described as the “faithful agent” model, where interpreters do not
shape the law according to their own preferences, but instead try to extract
meaning from statutes as accurately as possible (using any interpretive theory,
whether textualist, purposivist, or otherwise).36 Elliott suggested that agencies
turned away from this model after Chevron, substituting their own value
judgments for those of Congress. While we should not overstate the starkness of
the shift— agencies will generally consider both policy and legal issues in their

30.
Textualists, purposivists, and intentionalists debate the extent to which each of these should be
used as evidence of statutory meaning. However, each of these schools of thought is ultimately interested in
determining the objective meaning of the statute, rather than in de novo policymaking.
31.
Of course, agencies ordinarily do both to some extent. As described further below in this Section,
under Chevron, agencies may exercise normative discretion to pick among a range of options within a “Chevron
space” determined through traditional tools of statutory interpretation. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying
text. But outside that Chevron space, normal tools of statutory interpretation will still apply. This Article studies
the balance between legal analysis and policy analysis, recognizing that no agency will ever pursue only one or
the other.
32.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 843 & n.9 (1984).
33.
Id. at 865-66.
34.
Elliott, supra note 12, at 11.
35.
Id. at 12; see also Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120
YALE L.J. 1032, 1046 (2011) (“As compared to the predecessor regime, a major effect of Chevron is to
disempower lawyers within agencies.”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory
Interpretation as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 497, 532-33 & nn.71, 73 (2005). The
dichotomy between lawyers and subject-matter experts becomes blurred at the IRS, where lawyers make both
policy decisions and legal decisions. However, even at the IRS, there is a distinction between rulemaking on
policy grounds and on legal grounds.
36.
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989);
John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 119-20; Jonathan H. Choi, An Empirical Study
of Statutory Interpretation in Tax Law, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363, 368 n.15 (2020).
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rulemaking—Elliott’s view, common among administrative scholars, is that
Chevron initiated a significant move away from law and toward policy.
Peter Strauss similarly describes judicial deference as creating a “Chevron
space.” In his view, readings of the statute that are “permissible” but not
“necessary” fall within this Chevron space, and agencies may freely select among
these readings without judicial override.37 This provides agencies the opportunity
to make rules on policy grounds, if they prefer. In the same vein, other scholars
have created theoretical models that assume agencies optimize policy goals rather
than attempting to interpret statutes as accurately as possible.38
Opponents of Chevron often criticize agencies for replacing congressional
policy judgments with agencies’ own.39 In contrast, supporters of Chevron often
celebrate it on the same basis—that agencies can bring field-specific expertise that
Congress and judges lack, and that considering policy goals in rulemaking will
help to implement statutes as effectively as possible.40
But although many claim that Chevron has inspired a shift from legal to
policy analysis, there are some dissenting voices and substantial reason to doubt
the extent of Chevron’s influence. Although most would agree that Chevron deemphasizes legal analysis of statutes, some would disagree that it elevates
normative policy analysis instead. Catherine Sharkey argues that because
Chevron step two conventionally does not require courts to assess the normative
validity of agency rulemaking, agencies have little incentive to explain themselves
or to make rules on appropriate policy grounds.41 Within the Chevron space, it
could be that agencies make rules for less savory reasons (self-interest, political
expediency) or for no apparent reason.

37.
Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1163-64 (2013).
38.
Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural
Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 535, 536, 544
(2006) (assuming that agencies are “interpretive instrumentalists, attaching no intrinsic importance to textual
fidelity or analogous concerns” but instead attempting to “secure whatever interpretation would best advance
its substantive policy agenda”); John R. Wright, Ambiguous Statutes and Judicial Deference to Federal
Agencies, 22 J. THEORETICAL POL. 217, 226 (2010) (also modelling agency action as a function of policy goals).
39.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (complaining that Chevron empowers agencies “not to find the best meaning of the
text, but to formulate legally binding rules to fill in gaps based on policy judgments made by the agency rather
than Congress”); Beermann, supra note 6, at 784 (“Chevron encourages irresponsible agency and judicial
behavior. Agencies expecting that their interpretive decisions will be reviewed under a deferential version of
Chevron are free to disregard congressional intent and impose their own policy views even when it is possible
to have at least a good sense of how Congress would have wanted the agency to act.”).
40.
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297,
305 (2017) (“When a statute is unclear, and especially when a complex modern regulatory statute is unclear,
resolution of the ambiguity will inevitably require policy-making competence—which courts lack and which
agencies have.”); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885,
928-30 (2003) (describing, with approval, an EPA regulation formulated on pragmatic public policy rather than
purely statutory grounds).
41.
Sharkey, supra note 29, at 2370-73.
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Those who have described a shift toward normative rulemaking have
primarily relied on anecdote.42 While empirical literature suggests that both
congressional drafters and agency administrators are aware of Chevron,43 past
work has been agnostic regarding Chevron’s actual effect on agency activity.
Christopher Walker’s 2015 survey of agency rule drafters touches on this question
but produced mixed results. Walker asked agency administrators whether
heightened judicial deference would make an agency “more willing to advance a
more aggressive interpretation.”44 Willingness to advance a more aggressive
interpretation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an agency to shift its
focus to policy. For example, administrators might adopt an aggressive
interpretation not to enact ideal policies, but rather to entrench their own power,
or advance other selfish career goals at the expense of public administration.45
Walker’s survey results were inconclusive; while two in five administrators agreed
with this statement, others indicated that:
the judicial deference standard is just one of many factors that affect agency
statutory interpretation, and it may be a pretty insignificant factor in the large
scheme. And a couple rule drafters indicated that they had never personally taken
into account or observed others taking into account the type of deference the agency
expected to receive.46

Walker concludes that “broader generalizations about whether agencies draft
more aggressively when they know Chevron applies probably cannot be drawn
from this study,” suggesting that “the findings uncovered should encourage
deeper empirical inquiry.”47
A prior article of mine was one of the earliest efforts to empirically study
agencies’ relative focus on legal interpretation and policymaking, based on
regulations themselves.48 It revealed that the IRS became substantially more
normative and less statutory in the guidance that it issued during the 1980s.49

42.
Kavanaugh, supra note 4; Elliott, supra note 12.
43.
Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 66 STAN. L. REV. 901, 927 (2013);
Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1019 (2015).
44.
Walker, supra note 43, at 1063; Christopher J Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An
Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 723-24 (2014).
45.
Walker’s hypothesis that agency interpretations might be more “aggressive” when judicial
deference is stronger follows a long line of political science literature that generally models the relationship
between Congress and agencies as one between principals and agents, each of which is “assumed to have
different preferences.” RACHEL AUGUSTINE POTTER, BENDING THE RULES: PROCEDURAL POLITICKING IN
THE BUREAUCRACY 7 (2019) (describing an “external perspective" in the political science literature, “premised
on a principal-agent framework”).
46.
Christopher J Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 724 (2014).
47.
Id. at 725.
48.
Choi, supra note 36.
49.
Id. at 392-95.
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However, this study had several features that prevented it from serving as a study
of the causal effect of Chevron on agency rulemaking.
First, because it only considered tax regulations, it failed to compare trends
in IRS guidance with trends at other agencies. Second, because it examined only
broad trends over time, there was no way to separate the effect of Chevron from
other important contemporaneous developments that could have affected IRS
guidance, like the rise of cost-benefit analysis, the appointment of new textualist
judges, and the popularization of law and economics.50 As a result, this study did
not test the hypothesis that Chevron itself actually caused a normative shift in the
1980s. Third, as Section I.D discusses, most Treasury regulations were not thought
to be subject to Chevron deference at all prior to 2011. So, this prior study not
only refrained from claims of causal inference regarding the effect of judicial
deference in general; it also refrained from claims of causal inference relating to
Chevron deference in particular.51
Consequently, research discussing Chevron’s effect on the balance between
normative policymaking and statutory interpretation remains incomplete. While
Chevron is sometimes believed to permit agencies to make rules based on policy
considerations rather than legal ones, theoretical accounts are mixed and
empirical evidence on this question is thin.

B. Procedural Effort as the Price of Deference
Another way that Chevron might affect agency rulemaking is by changing
the amount of effort that agencies exert in complying with rulemaking
procedures, especially when they explain new regulations and engage with public
comments.52
The simplest hypothesis is that Chevron does not matter. The obligations to
adequately explain rulemaking and address public comments are procedural
requirements under State Farm53 and section 553(c) of the APA.54 In theory, they
are independent obligations that would apply equally under Chevron or any other
deference regime.
Another view is that Chevron provides a pure benefit—that it is a boon to
agencies, providing them additional cover to advance their own regulatory
preferences. On this theory, a shift to Chevron deference might embolden
agencies to write shorter preambles that engage less with public comments.
Writing a preamble is time-consuming, and reading voluminous public comments

50.
Id. at 393.
51.
Id. at 393-95.
52.
Procedural effort contrasts with what one might call “substantive effort.” The former focuses on
the procedural aspects of regulations, especially the process of explaining and justifying regulations through
preambles; the latter would focus on the drafting of regulations themselves. Procedural effort may or may not
serve as a proxy for rulemaking effort in general.
53.
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
54.
Section 553(c) of the APA requires that an agency adopting a rule through notice and comment
provide a “concise general statement of [the rule's] basis and purpose.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018).
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and substantively responding to them can be a daunting task for agency
employees.55 A lengthy and responsive preamble might be necessary if Chevron
does not apply and courts are likely to scrutinize the rationale behind agency
rulemaking. But why bother writing long, technical preambles if your regulation
will be upheld regardless?
This Article argues the opposite—that we should expect heightened judicial
deference to increase the amount of effort agencies exert in procedural
compliance. The Supreme Court has moved in recent decades to strengthen the
link between procedural rulemaking requirements and Chevron. Most notably,
the Supreme Court has linked Chevron deference with the notice and comment
process. The Court said in 2001 that notice and comment is a “very good
indicator” that a regulation is intended to have the force of law and therefore
receive Chevron deference.56
Similarly, the Court ruled in 2016 that “Chevron deference is not warranted
where the regulation is ‘procedurally defective’—that is, where the agency errs by
failing to follow the correct procedures in issuing the regulation.”57 It went on to
say that a regulation can be procedurally defective, forfeiting Chevron deference,
if the agency fails to “give adequate reasons for its decisions.”58 Courts also
sometimes merge State Farm analysis with Chevron step two,59 and the Supreme
Court’s considerable jurisprudence surrounding “Chevron step zero”—the initial
judicial determination over whether Chevron should apply—has suggested that

55.
POTTER, supra note 45, at 33.
56.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001); see also Encino Motorcars, LLC v.
Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (citing Mead). Relatedly, several scholars have proposed that regulations
should receive Chevron deference if and only if they are issued with notice and comment. This proposal,
advanced by scholars including Jacob Gersen and John Manning, has been dubbed the “short cut.” See David
L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 299
(2010) (coining the term “short cut”); Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705,
1719 (2007); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 931 (2004).
The “short cut” is distinct from the price-of-deference theory in that it is a normative proposal for
what the law should be rather than a descriptive proposal for how agency incentives actually operate. Moreover,
the short-cut theory primarily considers whether a regulation should be considered legislative and therefore
receive Chevron deference. In contrast, the price-of-deference theory assumes that an agency does conduct
notice and comment and that a given regulation will receive a fixed level of deference (Chevron or National
Muffler in particular). Given this assumption, it then asks how much effort the agency will exert in the notice
and comment process. Put differently, the key decision in the short-cut theory is whether or not to engage in
notice and comment; the key decision in the price-of-deference theory is how much effort to exert in notice and
comment, assuming that notice and comment occurs.
57.
Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 227).
58.
Id. Similarly, the Court ruled in 2015 that “[n]ot only must an agency's decreed result be within the
scope of its lawful authority, but the process by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational. It
follows that agency action is lawful only if it rests ‘on a consideration of the relevant factors.’” Michigan v. EPA,
135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (quoting Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983)). This pair of cases has been taken by some scholars to suggest that the Court is reconsidering its
Chevron jurisprudence to apply a more searching “hard look” review under Chevron step two. E.g., Sharkey,
supra note 29, at 2419-29. But the foundation for this move was laid much earlier, at the latest by Mead in 2001.
59.
E.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
1253 (1997).
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greater deliberation in rulemaking is a factor in applying Chevron.60 Similarly,
under the Chenery doctrine, courts reviewing agency rulemaking may only
consider justifications for rules presented by the agencies themselves.61 Each of
these judicial moves might link Chevron deference with rulemaking procedures
in the minds of agencies.
Of course, we should not overinterpret particular phrases from a few key
cases. The link between Chevron and rulemaking procedures remains ambiguous,
and Chevron conventionally remains completely separate from State Farm and
section 553(c) of the APA. Scholars attempting to link Chevron with rulemaking
procedures generally frame their arguments as a new proposal or a path for future
Supreme Court doctrine, rather than a claim about established doctrine.62
This Article therefore advances a more ambitious claim: even assuming that
Chevron imposes no procedural rulemaking requirements, greater interpretive
deference through Chevron should result in greater procedural effort. This is
because agencies will see longer and more responsive preambles as the price of
deference: agencies should invest more resources into satisfying procedural
requirements if the payoff is a regulation that will benefit from heightened
deference. In this way, the price that agencies are willing to pay should increase if
the deference regime becomes more favorable to them, much as consumers
should be willing to pay a higher price for more useful goods.
It may seem counterintuitive that increased judicial deference could
encourage an agency to spend greater effort to justify its rulemaking. The key
insight is that under a weaker deference regime, agencies may not find it
worthwhile to exert much effort obeying rulemaking procedures—procedural
compliance might become irrelevant if the regulation is rejected on statutory
interpretation grounds. Regardless, a higher degree of deference removes this
risk, increasing the payoff from procedural effort.
To illustrate this point, Section A of the Appendix introduces a theoretical
model of agency decision-making as a function of the amount of effort exerted in
rulemaking procedures, the level of judicial deference, and the benefit from
successfully promulgating a new regulation. The model includes two levels of
judicial deference, Chevron and “sub-Chevron” (which could stand in for any less
deferential regime, like Skidmore).63 It is purely theoretical: it is loosely based on
existing empirical scholarship64 but does not draw on the empirical evidence in
this Article.

60.
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); see also Michael Pollack & Daniel Hemel, Chevron Step
0.5, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 24, 2016), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/chevron-step-0-5-bymichael-pollack-and-daniel-hemel [https://perma.cc/5G2T-EKKW] (discussing Encino Motorcars).
61.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). While Chenery predated the APA, it has
subsequently been held to apply to formal agency rulemaking. See, e.g., Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery,
116 YALE L.J. 952, 955-56 (2007) (describing the widespread application of Chenery).
62.
E.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 29; Sharkey, supra note 29.
63.
Infra app., eq. 2 and accompanying text.
64.
See infra note 5 and accompanying text.
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The model follows the standard view that State Farm and judicial
interpretations of section 553(c) of the APA dictate agencies’ obligation to
explain rules and respond to comments, whereas judicial deference asks whether
a regulation is substantively permissible in light of the statute. Consequently, the
model takes the probability that a regulation will be upheld on judicial deference
grounds as given (because it depends on factors outside the model) and treats the
probability of compliance with State Farm and section 553(c) as a function of
effort in explaining rules and responding to public comments. The overall
probability that a regulation will be upheld is simply the product of these two
probabilities.
Note that this model is agnostic about agency motivations. Agencies might
desire good governance; or pursue self-interest (for example, they might aim to
avoid the embarrassment of having regulations overturned); or view rulemaking
as performative; or some combination of the three. The model merely assumes
that agencies prefer for their regulations to be upheld.
The model has several features that mimic current regulatory practice. First,
the probabilities have a minimum value above zero, reflecting a baseline
likelihood that any particular regulation will be upheld, even with minimal agency
effort. Second, the probability that rulemaking will be upheld under State Farm
smoothly increases as a function of effort (in mathematical terms, it
monotonically increases). Third, there are decreasing returns to additional
procedural effort (in mathematical terms, the probability function is concave), so
that the likelihood a regulation is upheld is ultimately bounded by a maximum
likelihood depending on the deference regime (80% for Chevron, 50% for subChevron).65 Fourth, the likelihood that a regulation will be upheld is always higher
where Chevron applies than under the less deferential regime. The model does
not assume that Chevron is less deferential than the alternative at any point on
the curve. Agencies might prefer to exert more effort even though, and indeed
precisely because, Chevron is always more deferential at any given level of effort.
Given these probability functions, we can model agency action as an attempt
to maximize utility as a function of procedural effort. Effort is directly costly,
lowering utility; however, it also increases utility by increasing the likelihood that
a regulation will be upheld.66 Within this model, heightened judicial deference
increases the optimal amount of effort that an agency exerts in rulemaking.
Section A of the Appendix includes more formal mathematical discussion and a
proof of this result. The proof depends on a limited set of assumptions, primarily
monotonicity and concavity, and any probability function with these properties
will satisfy the proof. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the probability that a
65.
These percentages are loosely based on empirical findings by Kent Barnett and Chris Walker that
agencies prevailed 77.4% of the time under Chevron and 56% of the time under Skidmore within their sample
of cases. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017).
Because regulations challenged in court are likely the ones with the lowest probability of being upheld, the true
percentage likelihood of prevailing is probably higher across the entire population of issued regulations.
66.
See infra app., eq. 1 and accompanying text.
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regulation will be upheld as a logistic function, and Figure 2 illustrates expected
utility as a function of procedural effort, again using the logistic function. But any
other concave, monotonically increasing function could also be used.
Figure 1: Probability that a Regulation Is Upheld as a Function of
Procedural Effort

Figure 2: Expected Utility as a Function of Procedural Effort

The theory that procedural effort serves as the price of deference therefore
operates along two potential paths. First, as the model suggests, even if judicial
deference and rulemaking procedures are completely separate as a theoretical
matter, agencies have an incentive to increase their procedural effort if judicial
deference increases. Second, we should expect that this relationship has grown
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even stronger in recent years, as the Supreme Court has gestured at a more
explicit link between rulemaking procedures and Chevron.67
Although regulatory procedures might seem secondary to the substantive
content of regulations, procedures play an important role in the modern
regulatory state. Oceans of scholarly ink have been spilled discussing the benefits
of notice and comment: it facilitates public engagement and makes agencies
democratically accountable, which scholars frequently cite as the primary
justification for judicial deference to agency interpretation.68 Public comments
provide agencies with additional information and more diverse viewpoints,
bolster agency legitimacy, and encourage agencies to engage in more deliberative
policy analysis prior to issuing regulations.69 The explanations that agencies offer
in the rulemaking process are also themselves important interpretive references
for lawyers and judges.70
On the other hand, procedural effort has downsides as well. It is timeconsuming and may not be an optimal use of agency resources. A considerable
political science literature has debated whether procedural requirements like
notice and comment ossify agency rulemaking by making it prohibitively
expensive to repeal or amend existing regulations, or to propose new
regulations.71 If judicial deference encourages agencies to spend even more time
and resources on procedural aspects of rulemaking, it could potentially lead to
even more ossification. Some scholars have also suggested that notice and
comment may be a tool for agency capture because its participants are
disproportionately powerful interest groups with access to high-priced lawyers.72
Still others have argued that regulatory preambles have become excessively long,

67.
See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
68.
E.g., Metzger, supra note 15, at 130 (describing the belief that notice and comment enhances
political accountability of agencies as an “obsession” among administrative law scholars); see also Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2007) (describing
some scholars’ belief that “administrative procedures may help to ensure that agencies stay more or less in line
with legislative preferences”).
69.
E.g., Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 15, at 968-69 (“In administrative law, the notice-andcomment process serves several related functions: providing information to decisionmakers, legitimating the
decisionmaking process, and constraining decisionmakers by pushing them to confront arguments that point
away from their preferred course of action.”).
70.
Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 361 (2012) (“[T]he text of a
regulation and its statement of basis and purpose [preamble] stand in a unique relationship: together, they
constitute the act of regulation, an act that is not complete without either element of this couplet. Based on this
premise, it does not make sense to interpret the text of a regulation independently from its statement of basis
and purpose.”); Kevin M Stack, Preambles as Guidance, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1252, 1252 (2016) (describing
preambles as “the most authoritative source of guidance about the meaning of agency regulations”); see also
Sharkey, supra note 29, at 2365 (describing how preambles serve as the basis for judicial oversight of
regulations).
71.
E.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic
Rulemaking: Is Federal Rule-Making “Ossified”?, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261 (2010).
72.
Clinton G. Wallace, Congressional Control of Tax Rulemaking, 71 TAX L. REV. 179, 182 (2017)
(finding, after reviewing a sample of tax regulations, that participation in notice and comment is “heavily
weighted towards private interests”).
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making them difficult to read and therefore less useful to lawyers and the general
public.73
Ultimately, as with the balance between statutory and normative analyses of
rulemaking, opinions differ on the ideal amount of procedural effort that agencies
should exert. But it is notable that prior literature has been so sparse on the link
between judicial deference and rulemaking procedures. This Article introduces a
new theoretical account within which such a link could plausibly exist, where more
deference encourages more procedural effort.
Of course, this is purely a theoretical model, and heavily dependent on
specific modelling choices.74 In reality, judicial deference might have little or no
effect on procedural effort, and the incentives described by the model could be
counterbalanced by other considerations that the model does not address. Only
empirical investigation can confirm whether heightened judicial deference
actually encourages agencies to exert greater procedural effort.

C. Does Chevron Matter?
Empirical studies of Chevron’s effect on courts have often argued that
Chevron’s influence is overstated, that courts invoke Chevron less often than is
commonly assumed,75 and that Chevron is rarely outcome determinative even
when invoked.76 This literature gives some reason to doubt that agencies really
73.
E.g., Alec Webley, Seeing Through a Preamble, Darkly: Administrative Verbosity in an Age of
Populism and “Fake News,” 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2018) (“[T]he public truth-telling function of these
‘preambles’ has become undermined by their spectacular length, often to more than a thousand pages longer
than their parent rules, making it virtually impossible for anyone (even lawyers!) to properly read them.”). On
the other hand, preambles to tax regulations have historically erred on the side of brevity, nothing near the
thousand-page preambles of other agencies.
74.
See infra Appendix Section A.
75.
William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment
of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1125 (2008) (“[T]he Court
does not apply the Chevron framework in nearly three-quarters of the cases where it would appear applicable.”).
But see Natalie Salmanowitz & Holger Spamann, Does the Supreme Court Really Not Apply Chevron When
It Should?, 57 INT. REV. LAW ECON. 81, 81 (2019) (“Our reexamination of [Eskridge and Baer’s] study finds
that the fraction of such cases is far lower, and indeed closer to zero.”).
76.
E.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63
ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 93 (2011) (“There is no empirical support for the widespread belief that choice of doctrine
plays a major role in judicial review of agency actions.”); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV.
135, 135 (2010) (“[T]he variance of the validation rates of agency action, regardless of the standard of review, is
small.”); Ann Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters: The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of
Agency Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 231, 271-72 (2008) (“Chevron has become the argument for the losing
side, with failure by the majority to adhere to a straightforward Chevron analysis emerging as a recurring
criticism in dissenting opinions.”); Richard W. Murphy, Abandon Chevron and Modernize Stare Decisis for the
Administrative State, 69 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (“Notwithstanding overheated charges, there is little reason
to think that applying Chevron, as opposed to a supposedly tighter standard of review, such as Skidmore
deference, is frequently outcome determinative in significant cases.”); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 75, at 1142
(finding that the Supreme Court affirmed agency rulemaking at very similar rates whether applying Chevron or
Skidmore). But see Barnett & Walker, supra note 65, at 6 (finding that different forms of judicial deference
result in substantially different rates of affirmation at circuit courts); Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd &
Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1468 (2018) (“We
find that Chevron deference significantly curbs (but does not fully constrain) judicial discretion.”).
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alter their rulemaking practices in response to Chevron, if administrators believe
that Chevron is ineffective (either based on their own observations or based on
the empirical literature).
Separately, scholars and judges have provided additional theoretical reasons
to doubt that Chevron’s imposition (or, conversely, its abolition) really changes
the applicable level of judicial deference. Certain judges, including Justice Breyer
and former Judge Posner, have suggested that Chevron is not in fact much more
deferential than the standard one step down, Skidmore77 deference.78 And some
scholars and courts have merged Chevron’s “reasonableness” standard79 with the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard that preceded it under the APA.80 While
Chevron remains frequently discussed and highly influential in spite of these
critiques, they provide some reason to doubt that Chevron had the impact
suggested by thinkers like Elliott81 or by the price-of-deference model.
Thus, a significant gap remains in the empirical literature on the effects of
Chevron. Many theorists believe that Chevron encourages agencies to focus on
policy issues rather than legal ones; but others disagree, and empirical evidence is
limited on this point. I propose in this Article that Chevron encourages agencies
to increase efforts in procedural aspects of rulemaking, but this new theory cuts
against conventional wisdom and has not yet been tested. And, contrary to these
A related but separate line of scholarship considers the frequency of litigation challenges to agency rulemaking.
See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Litigating EPA Rules: A Fifty-Year Retrospective of
Environmental Rulemaking in the Courts, 70 CASE W. L. REV. 1007 (2020) (empirically studying the rates at
which EPA regulations were challenged in court and the frequency of success in these lawsuits).
77.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding subregulatory guidance, “while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do[es] constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance”). Courts have long held that agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes might be “entitled to very great respect.” Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827); see also Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931) (holding
that contemporaneous construction of an administering agency was “entitled to respectful consideration”);
Swendig v. Wash. Water Power Co., 265 U.S. 322, 331 (1924) (same).
78.
Murphy, supra note 76, at 41-42.
79.
E.g., Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (“[U]nder Chevron step two, we ask whether
an agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’”); Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 76 F.3d
1234, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he second step of Chevron . . . overlaps with the arbitrary and capricious
standard”); Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives
the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 710 (2007) (describing how certain
scholars have argued that “arbitrary and capricious” is the appropriate standard for reasonableness under
Chevron step two, and citing recent decisions by lower federal courts and the Supreme Court embracing this
view); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254
(1997) (arguing that the “arbitrary and capricious” standard and reasonableness under Chevron “should be
deemed not just overlapping, but identical”).
80.
Foote, supra note 79, at 675 (“Before Chevron, courts tended to use the statutory standard of
arbitrary and capricious review and its close kin, the substantial evidence test, for oversight of most agency
‘carrying out’ actions—that is, for review of quintessential administrative implementation of statutory
programs.”).
81.
Of course, it is possible that Chevron had an effect on agencies but not on courts, if agencies
reformed their rulemaking mistakenly expecting to receive heightened judicial deference. Beermann, supra note
6, at 783 n.9. But this argument requires an additional inferential step and seems less plausible than Chevron
directly awarding more deference to agency determinations.
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theoretical predictions, much of the existing literature on Chevron’s application
by courts suggests that it may not matter at all.

D. National Muffler and Interpretative Tax Regulations
Administrative tax law presents a unique opportunity to measure the effects
of a change in deference regime. Prior to 2011, the Treasury Department had long
distinguished between “legislative” and “interpretative” regulations.82
Ostensibly, legislative regulations were those for which Congress delegated
specific rulemaking authority to the IRS—for example, the grant in 26 U.S.C. §
1502 for the Secretary of the Treasury to “prescribe such regulations as he may
deem necessary” to tax consolidated corporate groups. In contrast, interpretative
rules did not require a specific act of rulemaking authority, but rather relied on
the general instruction in 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) that the Secretary “prescribe all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of” the entire tax code.83
The distinction in tax law between legislative rules based on specific
congressional authorization and interpretative rules based only on general
congressional authorization predated both the APA and Chevron.84 Importantly,
it differed from the mainstream definition of “interpretative” rules in
administrative law, which defines regulations as legislative if they “carry the force
of law.”85 As Kristin Hickman argued prior to 2011, virtually all Treasury
regulations (both interpretative and legislative) carried the force of law even prior
to Mayo. Moreover, Treasury conducted notice and comment for virtually all
Treasury regulations (both interpretative and legislative) both before and after
Mayo,86 another hallmark that a regulation is “legislative” in general
82.
The terminology derives from the APA, which exempts “interpretative rules” from notice and
comment requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2018). Interpretative rules are sometimes also known as
“interpretive” rules.
83.
See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act,
63 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1673 (2014) (describing “the long-held view of the Department of Treasury that tax
regulations issued under the general grant of authority in I.R.C. § 7805(a) are interpretative regulations within
the meaning of the APA”); ABA Section of Taxation, Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX
LAW. 717, 728 (2004) (“Interpretive regulations are those promulgated under the general authority of section
7805(a)”); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original
Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 571-75 (2002).
84.
Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92
B.U. L. REV. 643, 654-59 (2012). This distinction was unique to tax law. Id. at 656 (“Prior to the APA, there was
an understanding specific to tax law that general-authority regulations were interpretative and that specificauthority regulations were legislative.”).
85.
Ostensibly, a regulation that carries the force of law is legislative and therefore must satisfy notice
and comment procedures. Whether a regulation receives Chevron deference also depends on whether it carries
the force of law; but, confusingly, “it is not at all clear whether the force of law occupies precisely the same
conceptual space” in these two different contexts. Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND.
L. REV. 465, 467 (2013).
86.
In an empirical study analyzing Treasury regulations promulgated between 2003 and 2005,
Hickman found that among 137 tax regulations that cited general authority only (i.e., interpretative tax
regulations), only 10 were promulgated without notice and comment, and at least half of the 10 claimed a good
cause exception to notice and comment requirements. Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines:
Examining Treasury’s (Lack Of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements,
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administrative law parlance.87 Nonetheless, because my empirical methods rely
on the pre-2011, tax exceptionalist88 classification of some tax regulations as
interpretative and some as legislative, this Article generally uses “interpretative”
and “legislative” in that sense.
The interpretative/legislative distinction in tax law was not merely academic.
For many years prior to Mayo, conventional wisdom also held that interpretative
tax regulations would not receive full Chevron deference. Instead, they would
receive less-deferential review under National Muffler, a case that pre-dated
Chevron by five years. National Muffler addressed an interpretative regulation
that the IRS promulgated using its general interpretive authority under section
7805(a) of the Code. The Supreme Court concluded that the regulation would
warrant deference if it “implemented the congressional mandate in some
reasonable manner.”89 Reasonableness, in turn, was determined by a number of
specific factors, including:
whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin,
and its purpose, [whether the regulation was a] substantially contemporaneous
construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of congressional
intent, . . . the manner in which it evolved, . . . the length of time the regulation has
been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner’s
interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation
during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.90

National Muffler’s factors emphasize statutory interpretation, making it directly
comparable both to forms of judicial deference predating Chevron and potential
replacements for Chevron. Judicial deference in the early twentieth century, as
ultimately codified by the APA, simply awarded special weight to agencies’
contemporaneous construction of statutes and subsequent customary interpretive
practices.91 These are the exact factors discussed in National Muffler. Moreover,
many have suggested that the Court ought to return to a framework that

82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1751-53 (2007); see also infra notes 212-213 (discussing Hickman’s findings in
more detail).
Although the IRS ultimately conducts notice and comment for almost all tax regulations, sometimes
they are first promulgated as temporary regulations prior to notice and comment. Infra Appendix Section D.
87.
See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
88.
Cf. Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference,
90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006) (criticizing the tendency to treat tax regulations differently from other
regulations). After Mayo, the IRS has tweaked its definitions of legislative and interpretative regulations to
match other areas of law more closely, as reflected in the 2018 revision to its internal reference manual for
employees. I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 2.1.1.2.8 (Aug. 2, 2018).
89.
Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1979) (quoting United States v.
Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973)).
90.
Nat’l Muffler, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).
91.
Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908,
916 (2017).
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prioritizes statutory interpretation,92 making National Muffler a natural case
study for the effect of replacing Chevron.
Because National Muffler’s factors are so specific, it was thought to be less
deferential than Chevron, which set out a relatively vague standard for
reasonableness. And because the facts in National Muffler concerned an
interpretative regulation, most tax lawyers and judges believed that interpretative
tax regulations continued to be subject merely to National Muffler deference,
even after Chevron.93 In contrast, legislative tax regulations were thought to
receive full Chevron deference. The distinction mattered because interpretative
tax regulations were, and remain, extremely common. A significant majority of
tax regulations are interpretative in the sense in which tax lawyers used that
term—during the period studied by this Article, 74.1% of all tax regulations cited
section 7805 as their sole source of authority (meaning that they were
interpretative), and only 0.014% of tax regulations cited some other section of the
Code as their sole source of authority (meaning that they were legislative).94 And
regulations in general play an important role in tax law, especially since tax
statutes are often written at a high level of generality that leaves substantial space
for regulatory implementation.
In the decade before Mayo, the state of deference for interpretative tax
regulations had become increasingly unclear.95 Circuit courts had split on whether
these regulations would receive full Chevron deference,96 lesser National Muffler
deference,97 or some blurred combination of the two (sometimes on the basis that
Chevron deference and National Muffler deference were indistinguishable98). But
the prevailing view was that interpretative tax regulations were subject to
National Muffler deference rather than Chevron, and that National Muffler
deference was indeed weaker.99 As a result, the IRS would have expected that it

92.
E.g., Murphy, supra note 76, at 3 (“[C]ourts reviewing agency statutory constructions should,
contra Chevron, pick the constructions they deem best.”).
93.
Hickman, supra note 88, at 1557 (“Although the practical difference is not always apparent, in
[jurisdictions that accorded some Treasury regulations only National Muffler deference, rather than Chevron
deference], specific authority regulations are given ‘controlling weight’ pursuant to Chevron while general
authority regulations promulgated under I.R.C. § 7805(a) are given only ‘considerable weight’ under National
Muffler.”). As Hickman has pointed out, this reasoning was hard to justify given that Chevron itself dealt with
a regulation promulgated under the EPA’s general authority under the Clean Air Act, analogous to section
7805(a) of the Code. Hickman, supra note 86, at 1763-64.
94.
Infra Appendix Section D.
95.
Hickman, supra note 88, at 1556-59.
96.
Hosp. Corp. of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 348 F.3d 136, 140-41 (6th Cir. 2003); Swallows
Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008).
97.
Snowa v. Comm’r, 123 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 1997); Schuler Indus., Inc. v. United States, 109 F.3d
753, 754-55 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
98.
Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96 (2006), rev’d, 515 F.3d 162; Hickman, supra note
88, at 1557-58.
99.
E.g., Joana Que, The State of Treasury Regulatory Authority After Mayo Foundation: Arguing
for an Intentionalist Approach at Chevron Step One, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1413-14 (2012) (noting that
“[b]efore Mayo, Chevron did not have very much influence in the tax world,” and describing National Muffler
as “a less deferential, tax-specific standard of review”).
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would have to defend its interpretative regulations, at least in some courts, under
National Muffler criteria.100
The Supreme Court resolved this split in Mayo. Mayo concerned a regulation
promulgated solely under the IRS’s general section 7805 authority, and therefore
was a clear example of an interpretative tax regulation.101 The taxpayer argued
that the regulation should be given only National Muffler deference, rather than
Chevron deference. But the Court disagreed. Justice Roberts, writing for a
unanimous Court, failed to find “any justification for applying a less deferential
standard of review to Treasury Department regulations than we apply to the rules
of any other agency. In the absence of such justification, we are not inclined to
carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only.”102 He
concluded that “Chevron and Mead, rather than National Muffler and Rowan,
provide the appropriate framework” for evaluating interpretative tax
regulations.103
In other words, Mayo abolished the old, tax-specific distinction between
interpretative and legislative regulations, at least for deference purposes. After
Mayo, general administrative law standards applied to treat tax regulations as
uniformly legislative, and therefore uniformly entitled to Chevron deference. By
establishing that Chevron was the appropriate deference standard for
interpretative tax regulations, the Supreme Court brought deference standards
for these regulations back in line with those for regulations issued by other
agencies. In doing so, it provided a unique opportunity for an empirical study on
the impact of Chevron deference.
II. Data and Methods

A. Quantifying Text
Empirical scholars studying legal texts have traditionally read and coded
individual documents: for example, by subjectively categorizing regulations based
on their content.104 But better datasets, faster computers, and modern techniques
for text analysis have increasingly made it possible to use algorithmic natural
language processing in place of human readers. Rather than holistic, subjective
100.
Moreover, even prior to Mayo, some scholars had criticized the distinction between interpretative
and legislative as fictive. Most prominently, Kristin Hickman argued that tax scholars and practitioners were
indulging in “tax exceptionalism” when they attempted to carve out special categories of regulations solely
within tax law. See Hickman, supra note 88. Instead, Hickman has argued (both before and after Mayo) that no
Treasury regulations are truly interpretative within the meaning of the APA. See Hickman, supra note 86, at
1761-73. Hickman sparked a substantial scholarly re-evaluation of administrative tax law in the mid-2000s, by
arguing that all tax regulations should receive Chevron deference. Hickman, supra note 88.
101.
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. Comm’r, 562 U.S. 44, 56 (2011).
102.
Id. at 55.
103.
Id. at 57.
104.
Frank Fagan, Book Review, Natural Language Processing for Lawyers and Judges, 118 MICH. L.
REV. *13 (2021) (forthcoming) (“Older descriptive studies of legal doctrine that populate law reviews and
treatises rely on hand-coded cases and small datasets.”).
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assessments, articles like this one quantify texts based on the specific words that
they use.105
For example, this Article uses terms like “fairness” and “efficiency” as a
proxy for an agency’s normative orientation in promulgating rules. It then
calculates the term frequency of these normative phrases by dividing the number
of such phrases by the total word count of a particular text. A document with one
hundred words and five normative terms would therefore have a normative term
frequency of five percent. The Article similarly calculates the frequency of
statutory terms by counting phrases like the “interpretation” of a “statute;” it
calculates references to legislative history by counting references to legislative
materials, like congressional reports and hearings; and it calculates references to
public comments by counting references to “commenters.” Each set of proxies
includes an extensive list of synonyms and ignores capitalization, punctuation, and
stemming (word suffices like “-ly” or “-ing”). Section C of the Appendix describes
the proxies in greater detail.
Some existing work on statutory interpretation by courts does not examine
term frequency, but instead merely calculates the raw percentage of documents
that have included particular terms—say, the percentage of appellate court cases
each year citing legislative history—because this is all that has been feasible using
Westlaw or Lexis searches.106 Term frequency captures this nuance and more. The
regression analysis in this Article asks not only of how many regulatory preambles
cite certain concepts at all, but also how frequently preambles refer to those
concepts when they do cite them.
In addition, using term frequency rather than a raw percentage of documents
accounts for changes in the lengths of documents over time.107 Hypothetically, if
the IRS were to use one normative term every 100 words, then any increase in the
length of preambles over time would increase the likelihood that any particular
preamble contained a normative term. This would increase the percentage of
preambles containing normative terms, but it would not increase term
frequency.108

105.
A great deal of prior work has used either the count of relevant terms or their frequency as a
methodological proxy. Choi, supra note 36; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of
the Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower Federal Courts and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1 (2018);
Corey Ditslear & James J. Brudney, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme
Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231 (2009); Steven A. Dean & Lawrence
M. Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code: Navigating Between Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAX REV. 879 (2007); John
Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress: Explaining Trends in Supreme Court and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124
YALE L.J. 484 (2014).
106.
Bruhl, supra note 105, at 30 (“[T]he analyses in this Article rely on electronic searches, primarily
in Westlaw, to identify and count cases.”); Lawrence Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role
of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 453, 453-54 nn.118-19 (2005) (using Lexis searches
to assess methodology).
107.
Rachel Potter argues that agencies will tend to promulgate longer preambles when they expect
pushback from the President, Congress, or courts. POTTER, supra note 45, at 97.
108.
Note, however, that term frequency would not account for a nonlinear relationship between word
count and term usage. For example, imagine that the first 1000 words of any given preamble do not include any
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Term frequency also offers some advantages compared to more traditional
hand-coding methods. It is less reliant on subjective reviewer evaluations and is
therefore less prone to human error or intercoder unreliability.109 And, because
term frequency can be efficiently calculated by a computer, it allows studies to
deal with large datasets of tens of thousands of texts (like the one used in this
Article) that would be impracticable even for a dedicated team of human readers.
Finally, it is more transparent and easier to replicate, because the judgments when
calculating term frequency are primarily in the selection of terms rather than
sophisticated and subjective evaluation of individual texts. All of the code used in
this Article, in Python, Stata, and R, and the datasets generated for this Article,
are publicly available online.110
Of course, term frequency has disadvantages as well. Most prominently, it is
generally less nuanced in its evaluation of texts. “Fairness,” “efficiency,” and
other terms used as proxies do not perfectly capture the qualitative nuances of
any given agency’s explanation for its decision-making. As a result, term
frequency can only capture broad changes that are perceptible across many
different texts. Term frequency is also susceptible to changes in terminology—if
(purely hypothetically) issues described in terms of “justice” fifty years ago were
described in terms of “fairness” today, a simple analysis of the term “fairness”
might suggest a change in attitude where none occurred. Finally, term frequency
requires large bodies of high-quality data to be effective.
This Article attempts to mitigate these issues by focusing on high-level shifts
in terminology, rather than more specific justifications for agency rulemaking. It
also uses a relatively narrow 20-year snapshot in a time period for which highquality official bulk data are publicly available, which lessens the risk of
terminological change over time and quality issues in text analysis.

normative terms, but the next 1000 include many. If the IRS were to move from 1000-word preambles to 2000word preambles, term frequency would still increase.
However, this hypothetical problem would be hard to square with the results in this Article, where normative
terms and statutory terms move in opposite directions. That is, if normative terms increased solely as a
mechanical function of word count increases, why did statutory terms decrease over the same period? Or, if
statutory terms decreased solely as a mechanical function of word count decreases, why did normative terms
increase over the same period?
109.
Intercoder reliability refers to the likelihood that different coders will give the same score to the
same document. It is especially important since in most studies only one coder will read each document, and
several coders will typically be required to code a full dataset. See generally Matthew Lombard, Jennifer SnyderDuch & Cheryl Campanella Bracken, Content Analysis in Mass Communication: Assessment and Reporting
of Intercoder Reliability, 28 HUM. COMM. RES. 587 (2002) (discussing the concept of intercoder reliability).
110.
Code – How Did Chevron Affect Agency Rulemaking? An Empirical Study, JONATHAN H.
CHOI, jonathanhchoi.com/code-mayo-chevron (last updated Aug. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/PE8W-4CNR].
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B. Preambles as Windows into the Regulatory Process
The APA requires any agency issuing a new regulation to also write a
“statement of basis and purpose,” informally known as a preamble.111 The
preamble explains the agency’s rationale for the regulation and provides
important guidance on how the regulation will apply. In addition, the preamble
responds to any suggestions received in notice and comment. This Article studies
the text of regulatory preambles in order to assess changes in rulemaking style.
The obvious alternative would be to study the text of regulations themselves.
However, regulatory text does not reveal whether an agency enacted a regulation
for policy reasons or legal reasons, nor whether the regulation adopted, rebutted,
or ignored public comments. Instead, regulatory text is primarily driven by the
substantive subject matter that the agency wishes to address. Thus, preambles are
a much more useful tool in considering shifts in agency attitudes toward
rulemaking.
A certain kind of legal realist might argue that preambles do not accurately
reflect agency priorities in drafting regulations. Agencies might, for example,
determine policies totally independently from promises of judicial deference, and
merely write preambles ex post using language selected to maximize the
likelihood of receiving judicial deference. Under this theory, changes in deference
regime would change the terms used in regulatory preambles, without changing
the regulations themselves. If so, then preambles would be an inadequate
substitute for regulations themselves, which are the real object of our interest.
This is a fair and fundamental critique of the methods in this Article. It
parallels criticisms of empirical analysis of judicial opinions, which sometimes also
posit that judges write opinions as post hoc rationalizations. On the other hand,
regulatory preambles are an important part of the regulatory process—they must
be adequately detailed in order for the regulation to be upheld112 and are an
important factor in judicial review of regulations.113 Moreover, they are frequently
used as guides to the appropriate interpretation of regulations,114 so (like judicial
opinions) they carry force even if they do not always tell a complete story.
First-person accounts from agency administrators agree that preambles
reflect (at least partly) the regulatory process as it actually occurs.115 Ultimately,
regulatory preambles are the best evidence that we have of the intentions of
111.
The name derives from the requirement under the APA that any agency promulgating
regulations issue “a concise statement of their basis and purpose.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018).
112.
Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Stack, supra note
70, at 377 (“In general, the failure to issue an adequate statement of basis and purpose renders the agency’s
action invalid.” (citing Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1982))).
113.
Stack, supra note 70, at 378-79.
114.
Id. at 361 (“[T]he text of a regulation and its statement of basis and purpose [preamble] stand in
a unique relationship: together, they constitute the act of regulation, an act that is not complete without either
element of this couplet. Based on this premise, it does not make sense to interpret the text of a regulation
independently from its statement of basis and purpose.”); Stack, supra note 70, at 1252 (describing preambles
as “the most authoritative source of guidance about the meaning of agency regulations”).
115.
Elliott, supra note 12, at 11.
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regulators and their thought processes in promulgating regulations. Although this
evidence is imperfect, it should be considered alongside other evidence in trying
to form a complete picture of agency practice.

C. Difference in Differences
As noted above, the primary obstacle to any causal inference regarding the
effect of Chevron is the difficulty of identifying treatment and control groups.
Chevron theoretically applied across administrative law when it was decided in
1984.116 So, even if Chevron coincided with shifts in agency rulemaking styles, it
would have been difficult to identify whether this was due to Chevron or to other
contemporaneous events.
The primary contribution of this Article is to exploit a unique treatment and
control group in order to test the effect of Chevron deference—interpretative tax
regulations. Because Mayo was an unexpected event that altered the IRS’s
rulemaking incentives, it can serve as the basis for a difference-in-differences
study.117
A difference-in-differences model can be used to study the effect of any
unexpected event that differentially affects a treatment and control group. Figure
3 below illustrates the basic difference-in-differences model, using interpretative
tax regulations as the treatment group (solid line) and all other regulations as the
control group (dotted line). The y-axis illustrates the variable of interest (say,
frequency of the relevant term), and the x-axis specifies two periods, before and
after Mayo. If Chevron deference has no effect, then there should be no difference
between the dashed line and the solid line. A difference-in-differences model
therefore tests whether the solid line is statistically significantly different from the
dashed line.

116.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
117.
Phrased more technically, difference-in-differences analysis assumes that “in the pre-treatment
the treatment had no effect on the pre-treatment population.” Michael Lechner, The Estimation of Causal
Effects by Difference-in-Difference Methods, 4 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN ECONOMETRICS 165, 178 (2010).
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Figure 3: Hypothetical Difference-in-Differences Model
Treatment Effect
Δ2
Δ1

More technically, the model accounts for differences over time that apply
both to the treatment and control groups (Δ1 in Figure 3), as well as static
differences between the treatment and control group (Δ2 in Figure 3). It then
attempts to identify any disproportionate effect of the unexpected event on the
treatment group—the treatment effect, or “difference in differences.”
By focusing on the difference in differences, the model controls for preexisting differences between the treatment and control groups, as well as static
trends. Hypothetically, imagine that courts generally deferred more to tax
regulations than other regulations as a matter of course, regardless of the
applicable deference regime. It would consequently be misleading merely to
compare the levels of normative or statutory term frequencies at any single point
in time (either before or after Mayo), because courts might be more deferential
to tax regulations during both periods. Similarly, imagine that pressure from
different presidential administrations had gradually pushed all agencies to justify
rulemaking in more normative terms. It would therefore be misleading solely to
compare interpretative tax regulations before and after Mayo, because the shift
in the style of interpretative tax regulations might be true of all regulations. By
instead focusing on the differences in trends between the treatment and control
groups, this method controls for level differences between the groups that persist
over time, as well as time trends that apply to all regulations.
If critics of Chevron like Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh,118 as well as
supporters of Chevron like Cass Sunstein,119 are correct, then the treatment effect
should be positive for normative terms and negative for statutory terms, reflecting
a shift toward normative and away from statutory explanations for rulemaking.
Similarly, if my model predicting a link between heightened deference and
118.
119.
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procedural effort is correct, then the treatment effect should be positive for
proxies of procedural effort (the length of regulatory preambles and the
frequency of references to commenters). If skeptics of Chevron’s influence are
correct, then the treatment effect in both cases should be small or zero.
Difference in differences is a useful tool in causal inference, but it makes
some significant assumptions as well, most prominently the assumption that the
trends between the treatment and control groups would have remained parallel
absent the treatment. It is impossible counterfactually to observe what would
have occurred in the absence of the treatment (Mayo). However, Sections IV.F
through IV.H apply several statistical techniques to assess the validity of the
parallel trend assumption and explore alternative models in case the assumption
is violated.
Beyond the basic example in Figure 3, additional control variables make the
model more nuanced and accurate—for example, by adding time trends before
and after Mayo in order to model changes year-over-year, rather than two blunt
pre-Mayo and post-Mayo categories. The full model controls for linear time
trends, separately estimated pre- and post-Mayo; it also controls for the type of
regulatory document (rule, amendment, notice, or other), the length of the
relevant regulation’s text,120 the reading level of the preamble,121 and the party of
the president in power when the regulation was promulgated. Controlling for the
type of regulatory document and the length of the associated regulation addresses
bias from changes in the types of regulations issued over time, as well as
complexity or length of underlying regulations; controlling for reading level
addresses bias from changes in the overall complexity of preambles over time,
which could potentially be correlated with interpretive methodology; and
controlling for party of the current presidential administration addresses bias
from shifts in regime and possible concomitant shifts in administrative priorities.
An additional nuance is that this Article uses a two-part regression model
to analyze specific terms, meaning that it separately estimates the likelihood that
a preamble will use any terms of a particular type (step one) and, conditional on
using at least one term of that type, the quantity of terms used (step two).122
The two-part model is used in order to more accurately model distributional
features of the term frequency data, and the two steps are ultimately combined to
produce estimates of average linear marginal effects, much like a conventional
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.123 However, the two-step regression also
has the benefit of more granularly modeling the effect of Chevron. For example,
120.
Note that the regressions do not control for the length of the preamble, which is already used to
calculate term frequency.
121.
Reading level is measured using the Coleman-Liau readability index, which uses the average
number of letters per word and the average number of words per sentence to approximate the grade level that
would be appropriate for a given text. Meri Coleman & T.L. Liau, A Computer Readability Formula Designed
for Machine Scoring, 60 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 283 (1975).
122.
See infra Appendix Section G.
123.
See infra Appendix Section G.
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if a difference-in-differences coefficient were positive in the first step of the twopart regression, but zero in the second step, that would imply that Chevron makes
an agency more likely to use any instances of that term, but does not affect the
intensity of that term’s usage.

D. Potential Confounders
A key assumption of the difference-in-differences model is that the
treatment is the only event that differentially affects the treatment and control
groups during the relevant period. This is a qualitative question of study design
rather than a quantitative statistical question. To answer it, we need to consider
other events in administrative tax law between 2000 and 2020, particularly those
occurring around Mayo in 2011.
Mayo was a rare example of a Supreme Court tax case and marked a seismic
shift in administrative tax law. Moreover, it was a surprise to many tax lawyers
and scholars when it was decided,124 making it a good candidate as a treatment in
a difference-in-differences study. However, other court decisions and scholarly
commentary over the past two decades could also have affected Treasury’s
regulatory drafting practices.
First, prior to Mayo, the lines between Chevron and National Muffler
deference were not as crisp as one might like. The Supreme Court’s 2001 decision
in Mead provided an early indication that Chevron might be the appropriate
deference standard for interpretative tax regulations.125 Similarly, scholars have
argued against tax exceptionalism both before and after Mayo.126 This could have
caused the IRS to begin anticipating heightened deference even prior to Mayo.
As a result, the measured effect of Mayo, both in magnitude and statistical
significance, might be underestimated by the model in this Article. That would
suggest that the shift in deference regime could be even more consequential than
this Article indicates.
Second, developments in APA jurisprudence after Mayo also might
confound estimates of Mayo’s direct effects. These include recent Tax Court and
Ninth Circuit rulings in Altera Corporation v. Commissioner, which dealt with
Chevron and State Farm issues and which drew heavily on Mayo;127 recent
procedural changes, like OIRA review of Treasury regulations that began in
2018;128 and broader developments in administrative law,129 such as recent

124.
See Patrick J. Smith, Life After Mayo: Silver Linings, TAX NOTES, June 20, 2011, at 1253.
125.
See generally Hickman, supra note 88 (arguing, after Mead but prior to Mayo, that administrative
tax law should follow rules generally applicable in other fields of administrative law).
126.
For an early example, see Merrill & Watts, supra note 83, at 570-75. For a more recent example,
see Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717 (2014).
127.
898 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 131 (2020); 145 T.C. 3 (2015).
128.
See Clinton G. Wallace, Centralized Review of Tax Regulations, 70 ALA. L. REV. 455, 478-81
(2018).
129.
Moreover, the difference-in-differences model controls for developments in administrative law
not specific to tax law.
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Supreme Court cases that linked Chevron and State Farm more explicitly.130
These developments would tend to cause overestimation of the causal effect of
Mayo, which would be problematic for the model in this Article.131 Luckily, these
confounders can be addressed by shortening the window of time subject to
analysis to end prior to the confounding events. Section IV.D conducts this
alternative analysis and finds estimates that remain statistically significant, and in
some cases even greater in magnitude.
The third and most difficult category is any development approximately
contemporaneous with Mayo. The most troubling candidate is Cohen v. United
States,132 a D.C. Circuit ruling which held that IRS subregulatory guidance could
constitute a “final agency action” reviewable by courts.133 Cohen concerned
subregulatory guidance promulgated without notice and comment, whereas Mayo
concerned interpretative tax regulations subject to notice and comment.134 Thus,
Cohen should primarily affect IRS revenue rulings, notices, and other
subregulatory documents that are not studied in this Article. Moreover, because
it represented the decision of only one circuit on an unusually egregious set of
facts,135 its influence on broader IRS practice may have been limited. And, to the
extent that Cohen was finally decided only after Mayo and cited Mayo,136 it might
more properly be considered an application of Mayo rather than a separate event.
But the broader point remains: court decisions, no matter how momentous
or surprising, are not as exogenous as earthquakes and hurricanes. They are
written in a context that includes a constant stream of new scholarship, court
rulings, and administrative reform. This Article employs a variety of techniques
to isolate the effect of the treatment on the treated, but its findings are only one
piece of evidence and could be usefully supplemented by future studies.

E. Limitations
Part V employs various specification checks to buttress this Article’s central
difference-in-differences model. But some challenges resist statistical checks.
First, because this Article uses interpretative tax regulations as its treatment
group, there is a question of external validity—how similar is the IRS to other
130.
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct.
2699, 2706 (2015).
131.
Note that these developments are only confounders if we treat them as independent events rather
than consequences of Mayo. Given that they cite and are directly influenced by Mayo, it is not clear that this
treatment is correct, but it is at least more cautious.
132.
In re Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Federal Excise Tax Refund Litigation, 539 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C.
2008), rev’d, Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), aff’d en banc, Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d
717 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
133.
Cohen, 578 F.3d at 12.
134.
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res. v. United States, 562 US 44, 54 (2011).
135.
Cohen concerned an excise tax that the IRS had erroneously collected and agreed to refund only
for taxpayers who went through a “virtual obstacle course.” Cohen, 650 F.3d at 736. The D.C. Circuit noted that
“[t]he litigation position of the IRS throughout the history of the excise tax has been startling.” Id.
136.
Cohen, 650 F.3d at 736. The opposite is not true, that is, Mayo did not cite Cohen.
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agencies? How closely can we expect the specific experience of the IRS to
generalize if Chevron is entirely eliminated? Federal agencies are sprawling
bureaucracies with deep institutional idiosyncrasies, perhaps so much so that no
single agency can serve as a test case for others.
While no two agencies are exactly the same, it is reasonable to expect some
similarities in how different agencies would respond to changes in the level of
judicial deference. The causal stories presented in this Article for why judicial
deference would change regulatory methods does not depend on quirks of the
IRS, but rather on high-level incentives that one would encounter in any agency.
While external validity is always a concern, events that affect only a subset of
agencies remain our best means to evaluate the causal effect of deference regimes
on regulatory activity.
Similarly, National Muffler was a standard of review specific to tax law—the
more salient question for administrative law in general is not the difference
between National Muffler and Chevron, but between Skidmore and Chevron. It
is especially striking that Chevron would differ from National Muffler, since both
require courts to defer to “reasonable” agency interpretations, whereas Skidmore
deference is conceptually much further from Chevron. Thus, to the extent that
National Muffler was an intermediate deference standard between Skidmore and
Chevron, that would imply that the elimination of Chevron would be even more
dramatic than the findings in this Article suggest.
Moreover, after Mayo, some doubt remains about whether Treasury
regulations that become effective prior to notice and comment (like temporary
regulations) should receive Chevron deference.137 This could mean that postMayo regulations may not receive the degree of heightened deference that one
might have anticipated, which would attenuate the estimated causal effect of
Mayo. Or, inversely, the estimated treatment effect might be reduced if agencies
other than the IRS were emboldened by Mayo. If these other agencies took Mayo
as a signal of the Supreme Court’s interest in enforcing Chevron, then Mayo might
have encouraged them to rely on Chevron more heavily than before. If so, then
the control group would also have received some of the treatment effect, and the
comparison between the treatment and control groups would not be as clean.
Again, these problems would attenuate the measured effect of Mayo and
therefore decrease the estimated effect of Chevron. That implies that the effect
magnitudes and statistical significance of the results in this Article may be
underestimated. Consequently, it may be safest to interpret these effect sizes as
lower bounds in magnitude for the causal effect of Chevron.

137.
Lederman, supra note 84, at 662-63; Hickman, supra note 86, at 1760 (“Treasury is not the only
agency that promulgates binding regulations in advance of seeking and considering public comments.
Nevertheless, the courts generally consider regulations issued through such a process procedurally invalid unless
one of the four exceptions listed in APA section 553 applies. Many if not most Treasury regulations do not fall
within the scope of those exceptions.”).
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III. Results

A. Statutory and Normative Terms
To test the relative importance of legal and policy considerations in agency
rulemaking, this Article examines the relative frequencies of normative terms—
those referring to normative issues, like fairness and efficiency—and statutory
terms—those referring to statutory interpretation.
Simple trends suggest that Mayo marked a significant shift away from
statutory explanations for rulemaking and toward normative explanations.
Figures 4 and 5 show the annual average term frequencies for normative and
statutory terms,138 along with trend lines139 separating interpretative tax
regulations from all other regulations. (The year-by-year figures in this Article
generally exclude 2000 as a partial year.) These figures suggest an inflection point
when Mayo was decided, after which interpretative tax regulations become more
normative and less statutory relative to other regulations.

138.
Averages are calculated as the number of terms of a particular type across all regulations issued
that year, divided by the total word count of regulations issued that year. “Other” regulations include both noninterpretative tax regulations and non-tax regulations.
139.
The smoothed trend lines throughout this Article are generated using locally estimated
scatterplot smoothing, a non-parametric form of local regression that fits a smooth curve to data points. See
WILLIAM S. CLEVELAND, THE ELEMENTS OF GRAPHING DATA 168-73 (rev. ed. 1994) (describing LOESS).
All of the confidence intervals in this Article are calculated using bootstrapping. Given a sample of data points,
bootstrapping recreates a sample of the same size by randomly sampling (with replacement) from the original
sample. This is repeated a number of times, here 2000 times, and LOESS curves are recalculated with respect
to each bootstrapped sample. For each point on the graph’s x-axis (here, each point in time), the values of each
bootstrapped LOESS curve are stored and then used to calculate a confidence interval.
The confidence intervals follow the basic bootstrap (also known as the “reverse percentile,”
“pivotal,” or “empirical” bootstrap) equation. The basic bootstrap calculates confidence intervals using
some α such that the probability of an estimate lying within the confidence interval is 1-α. For example,
given α = 0.05 (a 95% confidence interval), then for any point on the x-axis, where 𝜃 is the LOESS value
in the original sample, 𝜃 ∗"."$% is the 2.5th-percentile bootstrapped value, and 𝜃 ∗"."(% is the 97.5th-percentile
bootstrapped value, the confidence interval equals:
(2𝜃 − 𝜃 ∗"."(%, 2𝜃 − 𝜃 ∗"."$%)
A. C. DAVISON & D. V. HINKLEY, BOOTSTRAP METHODS AND THEIR APPLICATION 194 (1997). Note that the
confidence intervals are the confidence intervals of the curve, not confidence intervals of observations. That is,
within each interval with respect to a given point on the x-axis, there is an estimated 95% probability that the
true regression line lies within that interval. But this does not imply that there is a 95% probability that any
observation will lie within that interval. The latter probability would be captured by a prediction interval, which
would take into account both uncertainty regarding the regression line as well as pointwise variance in the
distribution of observations.
See generally Choi, supra note 36, at 377 n.64 (providing an identical explanation of LOESS and
bootstrapping in a similar context).
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Figure 4: Frequency of Normative Terms in Regulatory Preambles, 20012020

Figure 5: Frequency of Statutory Terms in Regulatory Preambles, 2001-2020

These graphs can be further supplemented with regression analysis.
Regression analysis provides a specific estimate of the treatment effect and
controls for potential confounding variables. The full list of control variables and
more detailed methodologies are discussed in Section G of the Appendix.
Table 1 reports key findings from the regression analysis, which are laid out
in more detail in Appendix Section G. Tables 14 and 15 in the Appendix contain
full results from these regressions. All of the key results are statistically significant
at a 99% confidence level. In raw numerical terms (rather than percentage terms),
the average marginal effect of Mayo was to increase the frequency of normative
terms by 154.4 per million words (against a baseline average of 186.6 normative
terms per million across the entire sample), and to decrease the frequency of
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statutory terms by 68.6 terms per million words (against a baseline average of
104.2 statutory terms across the entire sample).140
Table 1: Estimated Treatment Effects for Normative and Statutory Terms,
2000-2020

Change in . . .
Likelihood of Using Any Normative Terms
Term Frequency if Normative Terms Are
Used
Overall Normative Term Frequency
Likelihood of Using Any Statutory Terms
Term Frequency if Statutory Terms Are Used
Overall Statutory Term Frequency

+126.8%***
+22.6%***
+137.3%***
-37.7%***
-20.9%***
-48.5%***

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Taken together, these findings suggest that the application of Chevron
deference to interpretative tax regulations had a large and statistically significant
effect on Treasury practice. These effects occurred along two different
dimensions. First, relative to other regulations, Mayo triggered an additional
increase in the likelihood that preambles of interpretative tax regulations would
discuss normative issues at all. Second, among the preambles that use normative
terms, Mayo triggered an additional increase in the frequency of normative terms
that interpretative tax regulations use. This implies that the baseline likelihood of
using normative terms comparatively increased alongside the intensity of those
terms’ use. Similarly, Mayo triggered a relative decrease in the likelihood that
preambles of interpretative tax regulations would discuss statutory issues at all,
and triggered a relative decrease in the frequency of statutory terms when they
were used. Again, this implies a comparative decrease both in the baseline
likelihood of any statutory discussion alongside a decrease in the intensity of such
discussion.
The overall picture is remarkably consistent. Mayo marked a shift toward
more normative and less statutory justifications for interpretative tax regulations,
compared to other regulations. This played out both in the likelihood of using

140.
Average marginal effects are calculated by estimating individual marginal effects per observation,
and then taking the average of these estimated marginal effects across the entire sample. They should not be
confused with marginal effects at the means, which are computed by subtracting the mean dependent variable
values between two groups (e.g., interpretative tax preambles before and after Mayo).
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those terms at all, and the intensity of usage when Treasury did use those terms.
These changes were statistically significant and consistently large in magnitude.141
What does this mean for efforts to reform Chevron? In some respects, it
underscores the claims of Chevron’s critics, who have long suggested that
Chevron causes a shift in focus away from legal issues and toward policy issues.
At the same time, many of Chevron’s supporters may be untroubled by these
results, and may in fact find this effect of Chevron desirable. The findings most
undercut those skeptics of Chevron who believe that it has little or no effect.
Regardless of the ongoing debate over the application of Chevron by courts, this
Article underscores that for agencies, Chevron matters a great deal.

B. Procedural Effort
This Article uses two different proxies of agency effort in complying with
rulemaking procedures: preamble length and the frequency of references to
commenters. Ceteris paribus, a longer preamble provides more detail and better
satisfies the requirements of State Farm and the APA. (Because the regression
analysis controls for regulation length, it specifically studies increases in preamble
length holding regulation length constant.) Likewise, the frequency of references
to commenters reflects an agency’s relative interest in addressing public
comments.
Figures 6 and 7 suggest that Mayo caused a disjunction in the length of
interpretative tax preambles and the frequency of references to commenters. (The
slope of the curve for preamble length prior to Mayo raises issues with the
difference-in-differences model, which Sections IV.F through IV.H address in
greater detail.)
Figure 6: Word Count of Regulatory Preambles, 2001-2020

141.
Note that the changes are relative rather than absolute. The preambles to interpretative tax
regulations will naturally still discuss statutes a great deal; this Article finds not that they discuss statutes little,
but that they discuss them less.
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Figure 7: Frequency of References to Commenters in Regulatory Preambles,
2001-2020

These trends are generally consistent with the hypothesis that heightened
Chevron deference encourages agencies to exert additional rulemaking effort.
However, note that the upward shift after Mayo in Figure 6 is much larger than in
Figure 7. The magnitude of the shift in Figure 7 is very small and very noisy,
suggesting that additional regression analysis is required.
Table 2 presents key regression results; the full results are in Tables 17 and
18 of the Appendix. Note that preamble length is examined in a single-step
regression. This is because preamble length should never be zero, so the first-step
regression is not required.
Table 2: Regression Results for Preamble Length and Frequency of
References to Commenters, 2000-2020

Change in . . .
Average Preamble Length
Likelihood of Any References to Commenters
Term Frequency if Commenters are Referred to
Overall Commenter Term Frequency

+18.9%**
+1.1%
+34.7%***
+35.8%*

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regression analysis suggests that Mayo significantly increased the average
length of preambles by 18.9%. The analysis also suggests that Mayo increased the
frequency of references to commenters, albeit in a subtler way. Based on these
results, Mayo did not significantly affect the likelihood of any particular preamble
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referring to commenters; however, it significantly increased the intensity of
discussion of comments by 34.7%. This latter finding makes intuitive sense. Some
regulations only refer to public comments cursorily, or do so in passing while
acknowledging the agency’s obligations to consider comments under the APA.142
The term frequency of references to commenters conditional on at least one
reference is a much better proxy for the depth of engagement with public
comments. The overall estimated effect of Mayo on references to public
comments is also large in magnitude, although because it is a noisier estimate, it
is less statistically significant than the other results in this Article.
In non-percentage terms, the average marginal effect of Mayo was to
increase preamble length by 250.3 words (against a baseline average of 1355.7
words across the entire sample) and to increase references to commenters by
183.5 words per million (against a baseline average of 599.8 words across the
entire sample).
The link between Chevron deference and procedural effort finds additional
support in the academic commentary that followed Mayo. Although Mayo only
concerned the application of Chevron to an interpretative tax regulation and not
Treasury’s obligation to conduct notice and comment, some scholars drew the
connection on their own: they argued that because Chevron deference only
applied to regulations carrying the force of law, and because regulations carrying
the force of law must be promulgated through notice and comment, any ruling
that expanded the reach of Chevron among tax regulations necessarily expanded
notice and comment obligations as well.143
The Chief Counsel of the IRS noted shortly after Mayo that “great power
bring[s] great responsibility,” and that the new application of Chevron deference
obligated the IRS to “make choices based on wise public policy,” to “consider
secondary and tertiary effects on stakeholders and the regulatory system writ
large,” and to “consult at length with affected internal and external parties.”144
Moreover, immediately after Mayo, the IRS revised its internal guidelines to drop
the longstanding claim that “most IRS/Treasury regulations are interpretative,
and therefore not subject to” procedural requirements under the APA.145 Thus
the scholarly commentary, statements from key IRS officials, and changes to IRS
guidelines all support the view that procedural effort serves as the price of
deference.
Procedural requirements play an important role in ongoing debates over the
future of Chevron. Some scholars have suggested that Chevron should be
modified to ask more deeply whether preambles provide adequate explanation
142.
Updating OSHA Standards Based on National Consensus Standards; Signage, 78 Fed. Reg.
35,560 (June 13, 2013) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1926).
143.
E.g., Richard W. Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative Law and Tax Exceptionalism, 64 DUKE L.J.
ONLINE 21, 23 (2014); Michael Hall, From Muffler to Mayo: The Supreme Court’s Decision to Apply Chevron
to Treasury Regulations and Its Impact on Taxpayers, 65 TAX LAW. 695, 708-09 (2012).
144.
IRS Chief Counsel Discusses Guidance, IRS Challenges, 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 22-15 (Jan.
25, 2011).
145.
Hickman, supra note 85, at 495-96 n.164.
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for rulemaking. Catherine Sharkey, for example, recently proposed the
incorporation of State Farm “reasoned decisionmaking” review into Chevron,
requiring judges to take a “hard look” at the policy rationale for rulemaking
rather than labelling any choice between two permissible interpretations of a
statute per se reasonable.146 Other administrative law scholars have suggested
similar moves that substantively evaluate agency explanations for regulations as
part of Chevron step two.147
Most of these sources describe increased scrutiny during Chevron as
normatively desirable, but not yet established doctrine. They also suggest that
Chevron step two provides sufficient deference that agencies have little incentive
to explain the policies underlying their rules.148 But if agencies treat increased
public engagement as the price of deference, it could be that one key benefit of
more intense judicial review during Chevron step two—more careful deliberation
by agencies during rulemaking—is already present under the status quo. That is,
Chevron might already incentivize agencies to engage in a more thorough and
responsive rulemaking process.
The evidence from this Article that Chevron increases procedural effort
ultimately complements the recommendations of scholars attempting to bring
hard-look review into Chevron step two. It suggests that wholesale elimination of
Chevron would exacerbate existing complaints that agencies provide inadequate
explanation for their rulemaking.149 Thus, scholars hoping for a beefier
rulemaking process should push for reform, rather than elimination, of Chevron
deference.

C. Case Studies
Consider two case studies that concretely illustrate this Article’s quantitative
findings. The first is a set of regulations promulgated in 2008, roughly three years
prior to Mayo;150 the second is a set of regulations promulgated in 2014, roughly
three years after.151 These regulations illustrate a shift away from legal analysis
and toward policy analysis, as well as an uptick in procedural effort. Both
regulations cite section 7805 of the Code as their sole source of authority,152

146.
Sharkey, supra note 29.
147.
E.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 29; Levin, supra note 79.
148.
E.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 29, at 131 (“HHS, however, failed to explain how its interpretation
responded to many of the policy concerns raised by the comments filed in the rulemaking proceeding.”).
149.
E.g., Sharkey, supra note 29, at 2365.
150.
Suspension of Statutes of Limitations in Third-Party and John Doe Summons Disputes and
Expansion of Taxpayers’ Rights To Receive Notice and Seek Judicial Review of Third-Party Summonses, 73
Fed. Reg. 23,342 (Apr. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Summonses Regulations].
151.
Section 67 Limitations on Estates or Trusts, 79 Fed. Reg. 26,616 (May 9, 2014) [hereinafter
Section 67 Limitations].
152.
Summonses Regulations, supra note 150, at 23,342-44; Section 67 Limitations, supra note 151, at
26,616-18.
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making them interpretative tax regulations. Both were final regulations issued
following notice and comment on earlier proposed regulations.153
The first, pre-Mayo set of regulations governs the summonses that the IRS
issues to third parties in the course of tax assessments. The preamble to these
regulations responded to extensive public comments. But the responses were
relatively cursory, and Treasury rejected all of the suggestions received in the
public comments. Moreover, it did so on exclusively statutory grounds, using
familiar tools of statutory interpretation: reference to statutory text,154
longstanding regulatory interpretations to which Congress was presumed to
acquiesce,155 the history of statutory amendments,156 and the general structure of
the statute.157
The second, post-Mayo set of regulations governs the deductibility of costs
incurred by trusts and estates.158 This preamble also responded to public
comments, but in much greater detail—although the underlying regulations were
roughly a quarter the length of the earlier set, the preamble was slightly longer.159
This time around, Treasury was both more responsive to public comments and
more policy-focused. It accepted many of the suggestions proposed by
commenters.160 Moreover, the more recent preamble emphasized normative
justifications for its rulemaking. In response to a comment arguing that Treasury
lacked statutory authority to promulgate the regulations, the preamble described
various grounds on which the regulation was normatively desirable: that it
“provides equitable tax treatment to similarly situated taxpayers” and “reduces
administrative burdens.”161 These rationales reflect a shift toward policy and away
from law, and they are consistent with the high frequency of normative terms in

153.
Summonses Regulations, supra note 150, at 23,343; Section 67 Limitations, supra note 151, at
26,616.
154.
Summonses Regulations, supra note 150, at 23,343 (emphasizing that the regulations were
“consistent with the language” of the statute); id. at 23,344 (arguing that a commenter’s suggestion “goes beyond
the statutory language and the IRS's authority to promulgate regulations”).
155.
Id. at 23,343 (“Nothing in the statutory amendments . . . since these regulations were promulgated
suggests that Congress intended to change” the meaning of “longstanding regulations” already issued.); see also
Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1823, 1879 (2015)
(discussing “the prevailing wisdom that longstanding agency statutory interpretations should receive heightened
judicial deference”).
156.
Summonses Regulations, supra note 150, at 23,343 (describing language changes in a 1998
statutory amendment); id. at 23,344 (“[T]hese regulations are interpretative of statutory provisions that have
existed as law for several years”).
157.
Id. at 23,344 (dismissing a suggestion as unnecessary in light of “the statutory structure”).
158.
Section 67 Limitations, supra note 151, at 26,616.
159.
The first set of regulations was 5325 words long, with a preamble of 2067 words; the second set
was 1308 words long, with a preamble of 2439 words. It is possible that any increase in procedural effort after
Mayo occurred at the cost of actually writing regulations themselves; this would be an interesting question for
future research.
160.
Id. at 26,616-18.
161.
Id. at 26,618. It also cited a relevant case, but did not engage in conventional statutory
interpretation. Id.
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the later regulatory preamble, in contrast with the high frequency of statutory
terms in the earlier regulatory preamble.162
IV. Specification Checks
This Part discusses a number of tests that validate the model used in this
Article and check its sensitivity to variations in specifications.

A. Reading Preambles to Confirm Proxy Terms
To confirm the validity of the terms chosen as proxies for discussion of
normative issues, statutory issues, public comments, and legislative history, I
randomly selected 160 regulatory preambles containing instances of these terms
(40 preambles for each category, 20 from the period 2000–2009 and 20 from the
period 2010–2019), out of the dataset used in this Article.163 I then manually
reviewed each preamble to check that the terms were used as expected. Upon
review, I found eight instances where the term did not accurately refer to the
concept it was meant as a proxy for, whereas in the other 595 instances, the terms
were used as intended.164 The overall false positive rate in the sample was
therefore 1.3%.165
The full list of preambles, including the specific terms used and full citations
to the regulations reviewed, along with explanations where terms were not used
as expected, is available online.166

B. Regulatory Selection Effects
Another potential issue is the possibility of selection effects in the agency’s
choice between regulations and subregulatory guidance. We could imagine a
simple model in which an agency seeking to promulgate any given policy chooses
whether to do so in a regulation, subject to Chevron deference or National
Muffler deference, or in subregulatory guidance, subject to Skidmore deference.
Any change in the level of deference accorded to regulations might affect not just
the agency’s approach to the regulations it otherwise would have promulgated,
162.
These regulatory preambles were selected as representative of the relevant shifts—the earlier
regulatory preamble has 5 statutory terms and 0 normative terms out of 2067 words, whereas the later regulatory
preamble has 4 normative terms and 0 statutory terms out of 2439 words.
163.
The preambles included both tax and non-tax preambles; because non-tax preambles
substantially outnumber tax preambles, the majority of the randomly selected preambles were non-tax.
164.
There were 603 instances of terms in total: 50 normative terms from the 2000s, 77 normative terms
from the 2010s, 34 statutory terms from the 2000s, 39 statutory terms from the 2010s, 89 commenter terms from
the 2000s, 212 commenter terms from the 2010s, 75 legislative history terms from the 2000s, and 27 legislative
history terms from the 2010s.
165.
For consistency, the false positives manually identified were not dropped from the sample.
166.
Online Appendix: Randomly Selected Preambles to Confirm Term Frequency Results,
JONATHAN H. CHOI, jonathanhchoi.com/s/Randomly-Selected-Preambles.pdf (last updated Aug. 6, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/P6HD-7FTT].
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but might also cause the agency to substitute away from subregulatory guidance
and toward regulations. Thus, even if an agency’s approach to any particular
policy remains the same, the average content of regulations might shift solely as a
result of this substitution.
Do selection effects drive the results in this Article? One reason to suspect
not is that the IRS has long been constrained in the resources that it can assign to
draft regulations. All published IRS guidance, both regulatory and subregulatory,
is issued by the Office of Associate Chief Counsel.167 The IRS publishes a Priority
Guidance Plan each year describing which regulations it will attempt to
promulgate,168 but many issues flagged by taxpayers will not be addressed in
regulations for years. Moreover, because guidance is frequently time-sensitive,
Treasury often issues subregulatory guidance in advance of regulations, either to
clarify the law for taxpayers169 or to head off potentially abusive transactions.170
All of these constraints will limit Treasury’s ability to freely select between types
of guidance.
In addition, if substitution were to occur toward an increased number of
formal regulations, we would expect Treasury to issue a greater proportion of
regulations to subregulatory guidance after Mayo. Figure 8 graphs the total
number of tax regulations171 divided by the total number of revenue rulings
promulgated each year, from 2000 to 2020. It shows the opposite trend—that the
ratio actually declined after Mayo.172

167.
I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.1.1(4) (Nov. 13, 2019) (“Associate Chief Counsel
offices are solely responsible for issuing published guidance.”). Note, however, that “on some projects, members
of Operating Divisions may be involved in the development of a project.” Id. § 32.1.1.4.4(1) (Aug. 2, 2018).
168.
I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.1.4.1 (Aug. 2, 2018).
169.
For example, Notice 2018-76 provided guidance in advance of Proposed Regulation 100814-19 on
the deductibility of business meals. I.R.S. Notice 2018-76, 2018-42 I.R.B. 599; Meals and Entertainment
Expenses Under Section 274, 85 Fed. Reg. 11,020 (proposed Feb. 26, 2020) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.27411, 1.274-12).
170.
For example, Notices 2014-52 and 2015-79 provided guidance in advance of Proposed Regulation
135734-14 on the treatment of inversion transactions. I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-42 I.R.B. 712; I.R.S. Notice
2015-79, 2015-49 I.R.B. 775; Rules Regarding Inversions and Related Transactions; Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking by Cross-Reference to Temporary Regulations, 82 Fed. Reg. 5476 (Jan. 18, 2017) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.7874-7, 1.7874-10).
171.
This includes both interpretative and legislative regulations.
172.
The absolute number of tax regulations issued per year also declined after Mayo.
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Figure 8: Total Tax Regulations / Revenue Rulings Per Year, 2000-2020

If anything, the decline in the ratio of regulatory-to-subregulatory guidance
might support the ossification hypothesis—that, in order to spend greater time
and effort promulgating each regulation, Treasury counterintuitively decreased
the total number of new regulations that it issued each year. On the other hand,
this decline in new regulations may also have been attributable to Trump-era
executive orders generally making it more difficult for agencies to promulgate
new regulations,173 or budget cuts forcing the IRS to favor subregulatory guidance
(which is issued without resource-intensive notice and comment). While the
precise explanation for the substitution toward subregulatory guidance exceeds
the scope of this Article, it would be an interesting topic for future research.

C. Legislative History as an Alternative Proxy for Statutory Terms
The frequency of statutory terms, as used in this Article, is calculated based
on the number of times that an agency discusses statutes at all, for example by
discussing how a “statute” should be “construed.”174 An alternative and more
specific proxy for statutory discussion is discussion of legislative history—for
example, the frequency of citations to Senate reports, House floor debates, and
other forms of legislative history. The term frequency of legislative history can be
used as a dependent variable in a regression in the same way as the term frequency
of normative or statutory terms.

173.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017) (directing agencies to repeal
two existing regulations for every new regulation).
174.
See infra Appendix Section C.2. For purposes of defining statutory terms, this Article does not
distinguish between interpretation and construction. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The InterpretationConstruction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010) (discussing the distinction).
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Because legislative history is the tool of statutory interpretation most
commonly used by agencies,175 we would expect it to follow the same trend as
statutory terms in general. That is, we would expect the treatment effect to be
negative with respect to legislative history, as with statutory terms. Table 3 shows
the results of a regression studying the term frequency of legislative history,
excerpted from Table 19 in the Appendix.176 As expected, the overall treatment
effect is negative, and the decline in the likelihood of any citations to legislative
history is statistically significant at the 99% level. However, the intensity of
discussion of legislative history essentially does not change. This suggests that the
more reliable effect of heightened deference may be to decrease the likelihood of
any statutory discussion at all.
Table 3: Regression Results for Legislative History Terms, 2000-2020

Change in . . .
Likelihood of Using Any Legislative History Terms -23.0%***
Term Frequency if Legislative History Terms Are +2.4%
Used
Overall Legislative History Term Frequency
-20.9%*
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In theory, another proxy for statutory references might be textualist terms—
for example, citations to dictionaries and certain canons of interpretation, like
language canons, which are favored by textualists.177 However, as I noted in a
previous article, the IRS has remained adamantly purposivist and uses virtually
no distinctively textualist terms (like language canons or dictionaries) in its
preambles, despite the rise of textualism at the Tax Court and other federal
courts.178 The dataset used in this Article reveals that this finding generalizes to
other agencies as well: textualist terms are so rare that they cannot be statistically
analyzed using term frequency.

D. Shortened-Window Regression Analysis, 2006-2015
Figures 4 and 5 suggest a general trend that the regression analysis supports,
that Mayo caused a break in Treasury’s approach to promulgating interpretative
tax regulations. However, visual inspection suggests that the results may be
175.
Choi, supra note 36, at 397-98 (describing how the IRS generally relies on legislative history to
the exclusion of textualist interpretive tools).
176.
Table 19 in the Appendix provides additional details from this regression.
177.
Choi, supra note 36, at 384 n.90.
178.
Id. at 397-98. Of course, the IRS frequently pays great attention to statutory text, but this is not a
distinctly textualist technique, since purposivists also prioritize statutory text as important evidence of statutory
meaning.
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disproportionately driven by changes within the last few years, especially the
increase in normative terms since 2018 shown in Figure 4. This is concerning,
because it might cause the treatment effect to be conflated with other important
recent events in tax administration—for example, the focus of the Trump
administration on issues of fairness and efficiency,179 or 2017 tax reform,180 which
may have caused a qualitative change in the type of regulations that Treasury
issued in the most recent years (because they are issued with respect to new
legislation).
To address this concern, I replicate the regression analysis in Part C for a
shorter window of time that only includes the five years before and after Mayo:
2006–2015. Shrinking the window of time tests the robustness of the model to
changes in specification and avoids outliers that may have been driven by recent
events.
Table 4: Regression Results for Normative Terms, Statutory Terms,
Preamble Length, and References to Commenters, 2006-2015

Change in . . .
Likelihood of Using Any Normative Terms
Term Frequency if Normative Terms Are Used
Overall Normative Term Frequency
Likelihood of Using Any Statutory Terms
Term Frequency if Statutory Terms Are Used
Overall Statutory Term Frequency
Average Preamble Length
Likelihood of Any References to Commenters
Term Frequency if Commenters are Referred to
Overall Commenter Term Frequency

+55.6%**
+14.3%**
+63.7%**
-61.2%***
-21.5%***
-66.5%***
+12.0%***
-3.4%
+20.7%***
+17.2%

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Full details from this regression are available in Table 20 in the Appendix.
The overall results of the regression with a reduced window of time are similar.
Table 4 shows that the sign of the coefficients for the key variable of interest are
largely the same, and the results remain statistically significant at a 95% level or
higher. The magnitudes of most of the findings are slightly smaller, except for the
findings regarding statutory terms, which are larger than the baseline values in
179.
Exec. Order No. 13,789, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,317 (Apr. 21, 2017) (directing agencies to promote
regulations that are “simple, fair, efficient, and pro-growth”); see also Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg.
12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017) (requiring agencies to undertake reforms intended to “lower regulatory burdens on the
American people”).
180.
An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution
on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
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Table 1. Because agencies take time to respond to changed incentives after court
decisions, one would expect the treatment effect to be greater the more time has
passed, and the decrease in magnitude is in line with this expectation. Moreover,
because regulations can take years from proposal to completion, we should expect
some lag before the effects of Chevron are fully visible.
The shortened-window findings are especially reassuring because of recent
developments in administrative tax law that otherwise might have biased the
results in this Article: Altera, Encino Motorcars, Michigan v. EPA, and reforms
to OIRA review of tax regulations, as discussed above.181 This specification check
suggests that the findings in this Article are not merely due to confounders.

E. Winsorized Regression Analysis
An alternative method that reduces the influence of outliers is to “winsorize”
the dataset prior to conducting the regression, by replacing extreme values past
some cutoff with values closer to the median. For purposes of this Article, I
winsorize by taking the bottom 2.5% of values and replacing them with the 2.5thpercentile value, and likewise by taking the top 2.5% of values and replacing them
with the 97.5th-percentile value.182 The net effect is to reduce the magnitude of
the outliers and therefore to reduce their prominence in the regression results.
Table 5 excerpts the results of the winsorized regressions, while Table 21 in
the Appendix contains full winsorized results. The key findings in this Article
remain statistically significant. In addition, the magnitudes of the coefficients
generally are smaller in the winsorized regressions; this is a typical consequence
of winsorizing right-tailed datasets, which, while useful as a robustness check,
does not produce point estimates that are preferable to the original specifications.

181.
See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
182.
The most common parameters for winsorizing are 95% (the one used in this Article) and 90%.
Because so many of the term frequency values are zero, infra Appendix Section F, winsorizing the left tail has
no effect, but winsorizing the right tail has a substantial effect on point estimates.
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Table 5: Winsorized Regression Results, 2000-2020

Change in . . .
Likelihood of Using Any Normative Terms
Term Frequency if Normative Terms Are Used
Overall Normative Term Frequency
Likelihood of Using Any Statutory Terms
Term Frequency if Statutory Terms Are Used
Overall Statutory Term Frequency
Average Preamble Length
Likelihood of Any References to Commenters
Term Frequency if Commenters are Referred to
Overall Commenter Term Frequency

+126.8%***
+13.3%***
+119.2%***
-37.7%***
-13.4%***
-43.6%***
+15.0%**
+1.1%
+23.6%***
+24.7%

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

F. Placebo Tests
As noted above, a key assumption of the difference-in-differences model is
that the treatment and control groups would have followed parallel trends absent
the treatment. Because we cannot observe this counterfactual, the standard
alternative is to ensure that the treatment and control groups at least followed
parallel trends before the treatment. We can do this by visually inspecting pretreatment trends (pre-trends) to confirm that they were parallel prior to 2011.
Figures 4 and 5 show that the pre-trends were similar between the treatment
and control groups for normative and statutory terms. Figure 7 is more equivocal,
but does not reveal obvious differences in pre-trends between the treatment and
control groups. However, Figure 6 suggests that the pre-trends substantially
differed for preamble length; the treatment group pre-trend sloped downward,
while the control group pre-trend sloped upward, making the reversal after Mayo
even sharper.
Another test of the parallel trend assumption is the placebo test.
Conventionally, a placebo test is conducted by excluding the post-treatment
period, cutting the pre-treatment period in half, and assigning the second half of
the pre-treatment period as a “placebo” treatment period. To conduct the placebo
test, I exclude observations after Mayo and analyze the period 2000–2010,183
assigning 2000–2005 as the pre-treatment period and 2006–2010 as the posttreatment period. The results of the placebo test are in Table 6 below (excerpted
from Table 22 in the Appendix), from regressions with full controls:

183.
The pre-treatment period used for the placebo test ends six months before Mayo is decided, to
exclude anticipatory effects from briefs and oral arguments in the Mayo case that preceded the decision itself.
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Table 6: Placebo Regression Results for Normative Terms, Statutory Terms,
and Preamble Length, 2000-2020

Change in . . .
Likelihood of Using Any Normative Terms
Term Frequency if Normative Terms Are Used
Overall Normative Term Frequency
Likelihood of Using Any Statutory Terms
Term Frequency if Statutory Terms Are Used
Overall Statutory Term Frequency
Average Preamble Length
Likelihood of Any References to Commenters
Term Frequency if Commenters are Referred to
Overall Commenter Term Frequency

+14.7%
-0.5%
+11.3%
+26.5%
+2.7%
+27.6%
-15.0%***
+11.6%
+14.8%
+25.5%

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The only statistically significant result from the placebo test is a decline in
preamble length. This is consistent with the violation of the parallel trend
assumption visible in Figure 6. The other results are both statistically insignificant
and relatively small in magnitude, compared to the results in the baseline model.
The results of the placebo test cannot confirm that the parallel trend assumption
is satisfied—the insignificance of the results could be explained by low statistical
power as well as by the satisfaction of the parallel trend assumption—but they
provide some additional reassurance in that direction. The exception, of course,
is the result of the placebo test with respect to preamble length, which must be
addressed in another way.

G. Extrapolating Pre-Trends
If the parallel trend assumption is violated, difference in differences will
produce biased estimates and cannot be relied upon. The estimates might still be
directionally correct if the pre-trends could merely be extrapolated into the posttreatment period. If so, then the effect of Mayo on preamble length would merely
be underestimated under conventional difference-in-differences analysis, because
Mayo not only set the length of interpretative tax preambles on an upward trend
but also reversed those preambles’ prior downward trend. Moreover, the
difference-in-difference estimates could be corrected by extrapolating the
differences in pre-trends to the post-treatment periods, a common approach in
existing literature.184
184.
See, e.g., Carlos Dobkin et al., The Economic Consequences of Hospital Admissions, 108 AM.
ECON. REV. 308 (2018); Manudeep et al., Broadband Internet: An Information Superhighway to Sex Crime?,
80 REV. ECON. STUD. 1237, 1257 (2013). Following Manudeep et al., I extrapolate pre-trends by measuring the
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Extrapolating pre-treatment time trends in the preamble length model
predictably increases the magnitude of the estimated treatment effect. It increases
the point estimate for the percentage change in average preamble length from
18.9% to 29.6%. The full results from this regression are presented in Table 17 in
the Appendix.
Table 7: Regression Results for Preamble Length, Extrapolating Pre-Trends,
2000-2020

Change in . . .
Average Preamble Length

+29.6%***

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
However, the assumption that pre-treatment time trends will persist into
the post-treatment period is a strong one. A skeptic might instead suggest that
the explanation was mean reversion—that some omitted variable caused a large
but temporary drop in the length of IRS preambles prior to Mayo, which merely
disappeared as IRS preamble lengths reverted to the mean after Mayo. If so, the
effect of this omitted variable would be falsely attributed in the baseline model
(even more so in the model extrapolating pre-trends) to Mayo. This Article
cannot fully address this possibility; it provides reason to remain skeptical of the
results regarding preamble length, and suggests that the price-of-deference
model would benefit from further research.

H. Synthetic Controls
Another method to address violation of the parallel trend assumption is to
use an entirely different model: synthetic controls. The synthetic control method
does not assume that the treatment and control groups simply would have
followed parallel trends absent the treatment. Instead, it uses a weighted
combination of other agencies to generate a synthetic control group whose
behavior is intended to approximate the behavior of the actual treatment group.

slope of preamble length relative to year for the treatment and control groups for years before 2011. Given the
slope estimate vg, for group g, where g is either the treatment group (interpretative tax regulations) or the control
group (other regulations), I specify the following model:
𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ< ]
= 𝛽" + 𝛽A ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$ ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽M ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜<
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽N ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< + 𝛽% ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽P
∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ< + 𝛽R ∙ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙< + 𝛽U
∙ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛< + 𝛽( ∙ 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒< + 𝛽A" ∙ 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒< + 𝛽AA ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ vg + 𝜖<

Cf. Manudeep, supra, at 1257 (using an analogous model).
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The synthetic control group is generated by taking a weighted average of the
actual control groups (called the “donor groups”), as well as covariates, to
minimize some loss function (usually mean squared prediction error185) with
respect to the difference between the synthetic control and the treatment group
for the pre-treatment period. The synthetic control group is then compared with
the treatment group for the post-treatment periods, and any difference in the
relevant dependent variable between the two groups is inferred to be attributable
to the treatment.186
Synthetic controls diverge from difference in differences in a variety of ways,
two of which are particularly relevant here. First, synthetic control analysis is
conducted on panel data where each observation is average term frequency or
preamble length for a particular agency for a particular year. In contrast, the
difference-in-differences analysis in this Article uses individual regulations as
observations, meaning that the difference-in-differences regressions consider a
much larger N than the synthetic control analysis. Second, as has been extensively
discussed above, difference in differences assumes parallel trends. While the
synthetic control method involves its own set of assumptions,187 it crucially does
not assume parallel trends.
Figures 9 through 12 below compare estimated term frequencies and
preamble lengths for the actual IRS and a synthetic IRS.188 In most years prior to
Mayo, the point estimates for the IRS and the synthetic IRS are relatively close
together, diverging in the expected directions after Mayo.189

185.
See Alberto Abadie, Using Synthetic Controls: Feasibility, Data Requirements, and
Methodological Aspects, J. ECON. LIT. at *8-*9 (forthcoming 2021).
186.
All of the synthetic control analysis in this Article was conducted in R, using the Gsynth package
published by Yiqing Xu and Licheng Liu. Yiqing Xu & Licheng Liu, Gsynth: Generalized Synthetic Control
Method, https://yiqingxu.org/software/gsynth/gsynth_examples.html (last updated Mar. 6, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/HM6H-3SS9]. Gsynth was used because of its ability to process unbalanced datasets.
187.
Abadie, supra note 185, at *25-*32.
188.
Strictly speaking, the treatment group is the group of interpretative tax regulations, since the IRS
also issues legislative regulations that are not part of the treatment group for purposes of this analysis. These
group names are adopted for greater simplicity.
189.
Again, the trend lines are produced through locally estimated scatterplot smoothing. The
confidence intervals are calculated using α = 0.1.
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Figure 9: IRS v. Synthetic IRS, Normative Term Frequency, 2000-2020

Figure 10: IRS v. Synthetic IRS, Statutory Term Frequency, 2000-2020
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Figure 11: IRS v. Synthetic IRS, Preamble Length, 2000-2020

Figure 12: IRS v. Synthetic IRS, Commenter Term Frequency, 2000-2020

In addition to graphical results, average estimated effects can be calculated
for the post-treatment period, and confidence intervals can be calculated by
bootstrapping the results.190

190.
Specifically, the standard errors were calculated using non-parametric bootstrapping. See Xu &
Liu, supra note 186.
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Table 8: Synthetic Controls Estimates of Average Treatment Effects, 20002020

Normative Term Frequency (per
Million Words)
Statutory Term Frequency (per
Million Words)
Preamble Length
Commenter Term Frequency (per
Million Words)

Treatment
Effect

95% Confidence
Interval

+186.7***

146.8 – 226.7

-209.5***

-352.9 – -66.1

+531.2***
+144.0

352.1 – 710.4
-85.2 – 373.3

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Synthetic controls provide some additional assurance that the main results in
this Article are valid. However, some doubt remains. Notably, the commenter
term frequency results are small in magnitude and exceptionally noisy, yielding
no statistically significant result. These initial results suggest that an effect may
exist, but additional research is needed to confirm and especially to generalize
these findings.
Conclusion
Although empirical scholars have extensively studied how courts apply

Chevron deference, almost none have examined Chevron’s effect on agencies.
While agency administrators are aware of Chevron deference, many have
suggested that Chevron may have little or no effect, either because it is rarely
applied by courts or because its alternatives are equally deferential.
This Article exploits the unique shift from National Muffler deference to
Chevron deference in 2011 to study the effect of Chevron deference on agency
rulemaking. It suggests that preambles to regulations that received newly
heightened deference increasingly discussed normative goals rather than
underlying statutes. This in turn suggests that heightened Chevron deference
encourages agencies to emphasize policymaking rather than legal interpretation.
In addition, the Article proposes and provides some empirical evidence for
a new theory of the relationship between judicial deference and rulemaking
procedures: that agencies view the requirements of State Farm and the APA as
the price of deference and will therefore spend more effort complying with those
requirements if granted more judicial deference. Empirical research suggests that,
after Mayo, the IRS began to write longer preambles with more extensive
discussion of public comments. However, these latter results are more tentative,
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and additional research is warranted on the plausibility of the price-of-deference
model.
These findings have a variety of implications for the study of administrative
and tax law. They contribute to the literature on tax exceptionalism, suggesting
that tax law’s special deference regime restrained Treasury from interpreting tax
statutes with the same emphasis on policy that has predominated at other
agencies. Mayo therefore set the stage for the pronounced shift toward normative
goals reflected in modern tax regulations. In turn, this shift affords each new
presidential administration considerable freedom in reforming administrative tax
law: for example, the Trump administration’s sweeping directive that Treasury
cultivate tax regulations that are “simple, fair, efficient, and pro-growth.”191
Most broadly, the findings suggest that judicial deference does substantially
affect agency rulemaking. This provides a practical counter to arguments that
Chevron is indistinguishable from other deference regimes. Some might conclude
from these findings that Chevron allows agencies to encroach on policymaking
territory that properly belongs to Congress, while also producing wastefully
overlong preambles that go unread except by privileged commenters. Others
might conclude that Chevron empowers agencies to properly deploy their
expertise and encourages them to provide necessary guidance that responds to
public feedback. Rather than favoring the arguments of either side, this Article
provides the terrain for arguments about Chevron to take place. Regardless of
theoretical commitments, this Article emphasizes the importance of Chevron in
shaping agency behavior.

191.
Exec. Order No. 13,789, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,317 (Apr. 21, 2017); see also Eliminating Unnecessary
Tax Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 9231, 9231 (Mar. 14, 2019) (eliminating 296 regulations that Treasury deemed
“no longer necessary because they do not have any current or future applicability”); Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82
Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017) (requiring agencies to undertake reforms intended to “lower regulatory burdens
on the American people”).
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Appendix

A. Modeling the Price of Deference
Take a simple utility model for a hypothetical agency:
𝐸(𝑈) = 𝑏 ∙ 𝑑 ∙ 𝑃(𝑥) − 𝑥

(1)

where:
𝐸(𝑈)
𝑏

=
=

𝑑

=

𝑥

=

𝑃(𝑥)

=

Agency’s expected utility from rulemaking
Benefit from agency rulemaking, which is lost if court
overturns rule
Probability that a regulation will be held a reasonable
interpretation of the statute under the relevant deference
regime
Effort expended by the agency in rulemaking procedures,
which will be higher when preambles are more detailed and
responsive to public comments
Probability that a regulation will be held to comply with the
procedural requirements of State Farm and section 553(c) of
the APA. The greater the effort that the agency expends in
complying with rulemaking procedures, the higher the
likelihood that it will be held to comply with State Farm and
section 553(c)

The model assumes that P(x) increases strictly monotonically above 0 (i.e.,
increasing the probability of success increases utility) and has a negative second
derivative (i.e., there are decreasing returns to procedural effort).192 Utility is
simply linear with respect to the probability that a regulation will be upheld.
Proof that

]^
]_

> 0:

The point at which utility is maximized is:
𝜕
𝜕
[𝐸(𝑈)] = 0 =
[𝑏 ∙ 𝑑 ∙ 𝑃(𝑥) − 𝑥]
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑥
Pulling out linear multipliers and solving for the first derivative of 𝑥 :
0=𝑏∙𝑑∙

192.

𝜕
[𝑃(𝑥)] − 1
𝜕𝑥

See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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𝑃′(𝑥) =

1
𝑏∙𝑑

By the implicit function theorem, we can totally differentiate this expression with
respect to d, which gives:
𝜕𝑥
−1
=
$
𝜕𝑑 𝑏 ∙ 𝑑 ∙ 𝑃ff (𝑥)
By assumption, P’’(x) < 0 (i.e., P(x) has a negative second derivative). Similarly,
b > 0 (the agency has a positive benefit from successfully promulgating a
regulation) and d2 > 0 by assumption, since d represents a constant probability
greater than zero that a regulation will be upheld on deference grounds.
Therefore:
𝜕𝑥
−1
=
>0
$
𝜕𝑑 𝑏 ∙ 𝑑 ∙ 𝑃ff (𝑥)
In non-mathematical terms, any increase in the deference level d should be met
with an increase in effort level x.
Note that this proof will apply for any function P(x) with monotonically
increasing and marginally declining utility. For example, the graphs in the body
of this Article model P(x) as the standard logistic function:
𝑃(𝑥) =

1
1 + 𝑒 g^

(2)

But any other concave, monotonically increasing function could be used. It should
also be noted that many plausible alternative models could generate opposite
results. For example, under a “satisficing” model of agency utility, where agency
administrators attempt to meet some threshold likelihood that a regulation will
be upheld but are indifferent to increases above that threshold, Chevron
deference might discourage additional effort by increasing the baseline likelihood
that a regulation will be upheld above the satisficing threshold. Or, alternatively,
if the probability that a regulation is upheld as a function of procedural effort is
sigmoid for values of procedural effort greater than zero, then the proof above,
which relies on monotonic decreases in the first derivative, will no longer work.
For these reasons and others, the theoretical model presented in this Article is
intended to suggest that the price-of-deference model is theoretically plausible
and merits further empirical study, rather than as itself acting as a piece of
evidence in favor of the price-of-deference model.
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B. Data
This Article analyzes a new dataset developed using bulk data in XML
format, downloaded from FederalRegister.Gov. The XML schema for these data
is available online.193
FederalRegister.Gov is an official government source for the rulemaking
activity of federal agencies. It includes final regulations, as well as proposed
regulations and temporary regulations. It also includes more procedural
documents, like notices for public comment sessions on regulations. This Article
analyzes all rulemaking documents, including proposed rulemaking, since
proposed rulemaking contains important information about the agency’s
justification for the rule and reflects the agency’s expectations regarding judicial
deference. However, all purely procedural documents (like notices scheduling
public comment sessions) were dropped from the analysis.194
FederalRegister.Gov includes regulations from 2000 to the present. This
provides a good range for the difference-in-differences study conducted by this
Article, but regulations issued prior to 2000 could be useful for ancillary research
questions—for example, a single-difference analysis of the effect of Chevron in
1984.

C. Terms Analyzed
The terms analyzed in this Article are largely drawn from prior empirical
work by myself and others, as noted in greater detail below.195 Using a consistent
set of terms across articles reduces researcher degrees of freedom and is intended
193.
U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, User Guide Document: Federal Register XML Rendition (2009),
https://www.govinfo.gov/bulkdata/FR/resources/FDsys_OFR-XML_User-Guide-v1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DV3G-MJKZ].
194.
Any rule that lacked a preamble was also dropped.
195.
Bruhl, supra note 105, at 30-31, 38-39, 41, 53 (listing and describing the use of search terms to
assess judicial purposivism, textualism, and canon use); Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive
Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1933-35, 1940-42, 1950-51, 1956-59 (2005); Choi, supra note 36, at 419-24
(discussing the selection of statutory, normative, and purposivist terms). The terms were primarily drawn from
my prior article, An Empirical Study of Statutory Interpretation in Tax Law, with appropriate modifications to
generalize a set of terms specific to tax law to other agencies. I removed terms specifically referring to tax
administration and removed references to the Congressional Budget Office. I also made modifications based on
my random review of specific regulatory preambles. In particular, I removed “complexity” as a normative term,
since a substantial minority of its occurrences discussed some aspect of the conduct being regulated rather than
the complexity of the regulations themselves. E.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Theft Protection,
71 Fed. Reg. 17,752 (Apr. 7, 2006) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571); Funding and Fiscal Affairs, Loan Policies
and Operations, and Funding Operations; Investment Management, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,361 (Nov. 5, 2012) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 615); Basel III Conforming Amendments Related to Cross-References, Subordinated
Debt and Limits Based on Regulatory Capital, 79 Fed. Reg. 11,300 (Feb. 28, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pts. 1, 4, 5, 16, 23, 24, 28, 32, 34, 46, 116, 143, 145, 159, 160, 161, 163, 192). I also removed “committee report” as
a legislative history term, as it led to false positives when referring to reports of non-congressional committees.
E.g., Irish Potatoes Grown in Washington; Modification of Special Purpose Shipment Regulations, 70 Fed. Reg.
44,252 (Aug. 2, 2005) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 946); Apricots Grown in Designated Counties in
Washington; Decreased Assessment Rate, 83 Fed. Reg. 4412 (Jan. 31, 2018) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 922).
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to allay concerns about cherry-picking terms to increase the statistical significance
of results.196 For purposes of calculating term frequencies, the terms are not casesensitive and are therefore all listed in lower-case. In addition, prior to conducting
the analysis, the text was cleaned and regularized by removing special characters
and extra whitespace. Text matches included partial word matches—for example,
the word “unfair” also includes “unfairness” and “unfairly.”197
1. Normative Terms
Any occurrences of normative terms in sentences that also included terms
associated with statutory interpretation (legislative history, textualist interpretive
tools, or canons of construction) were excluded, in order to avoid misclassifying
discussions of policy judgments that occur in the statutory process.198

good public policy
public policy goal
public policy grounds
efficient administration
efficient enforcement
compliance burden
financial burden
administrative burden
regulatory burden

burdensome
compliance cost
complexity
intrusive
fairness
unfair
injustice
unjust
clarity

2. Statutory Terms
Unlike the other terms in this Article, a document’s statutory term frequency
was determined based on the number of statutory sentences. A sentence was
designated as statutory if it included at least one word from the column on the left
below, and one word from the column on the right below. In addition, sentences
that include the word “section” but also include the phrase “executive order”
were dropped in order to avoid false positives discussing the interpretation of
executive orders rather than statutes.199

196.
Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson & Uri Simonsohn, False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed
Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant, 22 PSYCH. SCI. 1359, 1359
(2011) (describing researcher degrees of freedom as “exploratory behavior” by researchers who tend to “explore
various analytic alternatives, to search for a combination that yields ‘statistical significance,’ and to then report
only what ‘worked’”).
197.
This refers only to differences in prefixes or suffices. In contrast, “financially burdensome” would
not be a match for “financial burden” (although it would separately be a match for “burdensome”).
198.
See Choi, supra note 36, at 423 (applying the same exclusion).
199.
E.g., Reportable Quantity Adjustment for Isophorone Diisocyanate, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,331 (Sept.
11, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 355); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Modifications to
Reformulated Gasoline Covered Area Provisions, 67 Fed. Reg. 38,398 (June 4, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 80).
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Note that the terms selected require relatively intense engagement with
legislation for a sentence to be considered an act of statutory interpretation. Most
regulations will trivially mention some statute; the terms selected below aim to
restrict positive results to serious attempts to interpret the statute, rather than
casual references.
Includes:

AND

construe
construing
construction
interpret200
read

Includes:

code
congress
legislation
pub. l. no.
section
statute
statutory
u.s.c.

3. Legislative History
Congressional Reports

conference report
conf. rep.
conf. rpt.
conf. rept.
conf.rep.
conf.rpt.
conf.rept.
house report
h. rep.
h. rpt.
h. rept.
h.rep.
h.rpt.
h.rept.
h.r. rep.
h. r. rep.
h.r. rpt.
h. r. rpt.

h.r. rept.
h. r. rept.
h.r.rep.
h.r.rpt.
h.r.rept.
senate report
s. rep.
s. rpt.
s. rept.
s.rep.
s.rpt.
s.rept.
comm. rep.
comm. rpt.
comm. rept.
comm.rep.
comm.rpt.
comm.rept.

Congressional Hearings
200.
substring.

The term “interpretative” is excluded from this count, although it contains “interpret” as a
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committee hearing
senate hearing
house hearing
conference hearing

Miscellaneous Legislative History

legislative history
history of the legislation
conference committee
senate committee
s. comm.201

s. subcomm.
house committee
h.r. comm.
h. subcomm.
h. r. subcomm.

4. Commenters
Because the term “comment” returned many false positives, a more limited
list of terms referring specifically to commenters themselves was used.

commentator
commenter

commentor

D. Distinguishing Interpretative and Legislative Regulations
The line between interpretative and legislative regulations has changed over
time, largely as a result of Mayo. Prior to Mayo, it was widely believed (including
by the IRS) that legislative regulations were promulgated under specific grants of
regulatory authority, whereas interpretative regulations followed from Treasury’s
general authority to promulgate regulations under section 7805(a) of the Code.202
The IRS explicitly disavowed this view after Mayo,203 instead applying the
definition prevalent in administrative law outside of tax, that legislative
regulations demand notice and comment whereas interpretative ones do not.204
But even before Mayo, status as an interpretative regulation could be unclear.
The IRS frequently (both before and after Mayo) cited section 7805 as the sole
201.
To avoid false positives, the text was pre-processed to exclude the term “pers. comm.”, an
abbreviation for “personal communication.” E.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule
to List the Vermilion Darter as Endangered, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,367 (Nov. 28, 2001) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
17).
202.
Hickman, supra note 88, at 1545 (“Since long before Chevron, however, and consistent with the
tax community’s categorization, the Treasury has taken the position that its general authority regulations are
interpretative only . . . .”).
203.
I.R.S., supra note 88, § 2.1.1.2.8.1 (“Whether a regulation is promulgated under a specific grant of
authority in the Internal Revenue Code does not govern whether the regulation is interpretative or legislative.”).
204.
I.R.S., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, § 32.1.1.2.6.1 (Sept. 23, 2011) (“The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) exempts interpretative rules from the APA’s notice and comment requirements.”).
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source of authority for its regulations, even when a more specific grant of
regulatory authority existed.205 And after Mayo, internal IRS policy generally
directs employees to conduct notice and comment for all Treasury regulations,
including interpretative regulations.206
Despite occasional fuzziness, the best line to separate legislative from
interpretative regulations under the pre-Mayo understanding of these terms
remains whether their authority derives from section 7805, or some other section
of the Code.207 Accordingly, this Article categorizes Treasury regulations
according to their underlying authority. This is relatively straightforward, because
each Treasury regulation (excluding amendments and corrections) explicitly
states the authority on which it relies.208 The authority for each regulation is cited
in the Federal Register, as required by the APA.209
For this Article, I programmed an algorithm to identify which regulations
cited section 7805 as their sole authority (classifying these as interpretative
regulations), cited sections of the Code other than 7805 as their sole authority
(classifying these as legislative regulations), or cited both section 7805 and some
other section of the Code (generally excluding these from the analysis). Only
complete regulations were counted for purposes of this Article, so that
amendments and corrections that did not cite any authority were excluded.
Although the Federal Register XML data were of high quality, I individually
reviewed each of the authorities cited in order to avoid any false positives or
negatives. For purposes of the regression analysis, Treasury regulations that were
entirely legislative were considered “other” (non-interpretative) regulations and
were grouped with non-Treasury regulations, but Treasury regulations that cited
both specific and general authority were dropped from the regression analysis
altogether. Running the same regressions without dropping these specific-andgeneral-authority regulations produces essentially identical results, with the
coefficients on the variable of interest in each regression taking the same sign and
statistical significance, and with the point estimates falling within 5% of those
shown above.
Table 9 summarizes the number of Treasury regulations of each type:

205.
Hickman, supra note 88, at 1544 n.27 (citing many cases where Treasury was explicitly directed to
make rules regarding certain sections of the Code, but nonetheless cited section 7805(a) as the sole authority in
its rulemaking). One former IRS official recounted to me that, prior to Mayo, he and the IRS considered
essentially all regulations interpretative.
206.
DEPT. OF TREASURY, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE TAX REGULATORY PROCESS 1 (2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/Policy-Statement-on-the-Tax-Regulatory-Process.pdf.
207.
See supra Section I.D; Hickman, supra note 88, at 1557 (“Although the practical difference is not
always apparent, in [jurisdictions that accorded some Treasury regulations only National Muffler deference,
rather than Chevron deference], specific authority regulations are given ‘controlling weight’ pursuant to
Chevron while general authority regulations promulgated under I.R.C. § 7805(a) are given only ‘considerable
weight’ under National Muffler.”).
208.
See infra Appendix Section D (describing in greater detail the process the Article uses to separate
interpretative and legislative regulations).
209.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2) (2018).
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Table 9: Number of Treasury Regulations by Type, 2000-2020

Treasury Regulation Type

N

All Tax Regulations
Interpretative Tax Regulations
Legislative Tax Regulations
Other Tax Regulations (citing both
section 7805 and some other section
of the Code)

1480
1096
20
381

Ideally, the IRS would conduct notice and comment by issuing proposed
regulations and then inviting comments on those proposed regulations, before
issuing final regulations that incorporate changes in response to comments. In
reality, the IRS often feels obliged to issue temporary regulations with immediate
effect and then subsequently requests comments on those temporary regulations.
The IRS claims that these temporary regulations fall within the “good cause”
exception of the APA.210 Some critics have argued that Treasury thereby fails to
comply with the APA and that many of these temporary regulations are invalid.211
Nevertheless, because the IRS continues to maintain that its procedures regarding
temporary regulations comply with the APA, and therefore that these regulations
receive Chevron deference like any others, temporary regulations are not treated
differently from other regulations for purposes of this Article.
Another nuance is that Treasury declines to open a small minority of
regulations to notice and comment altogether.212 These regulations are generally
exempt from notice and comment requirements under the APA’s good cause
exception or its procedural rule exception.213 Because these regulations are rare
and hard to identify at scale, and because Treasury’s beliefs regarding whether
these regulations should receive Chevron deference are unclear (in many cases,
they amend or remove existing regulations, making it difficult to apply or not
apply Chevron to them independently), they are not removed from the sample
for purposes of this Article. To the extent that these regulations are not eligible
for Chevron deference, including them in the sample will tend to attenuate the
measured effect of Chevron, implying that point estimates will be too small in
magnitude.

210.
DEPT. OF TREASURY, supra note 206, at 1.
211.
Supra note 137.
212.
Hickman, supra note 93, at 1749 (finding that 11 out of 232 regulations from a three-year sample
were neither preceded nor followed by notice and comment).
213.
Id. at 1789 (“In sum, most of the projects in which Treasury issued final regulations without the
benefit of notice and comment seem to be good candidates for either the procedural rule exception or the good
cause exception.”). Of the eleven in Hickman’s sample, Treasury (incorrectly) attempted to argue that one did
not require notice and comment because it was an interpretative rule. Id. at 1787.
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The conspicuous shortage of pure legislative tax regulations—those that
solely draw their authority from some section of the tax code other than section
7805—precludes another potential robustness check, namely analysis that solely
considers tax regulations, using interpretative tax regulations as the treatment and
legislative tax regulations as the control group. Because pure legislative tax
regulations are so rare (18 in this sample), N is too small to conduct a meaningful
analysis.
A final potential issue is Treasury’s unusual format for citing statutory
authority. Many Treasury regulations that cite only Section 7805 of the Code
(making them prima facie interpretative) specifically cite “Section 7805 * * *.”214
According to one source, the three asterisks are “an agreed-upon signal from the
I.R.S. to the Office of the Federal Register (O.F.R.)” to incorporate by reference
specific authority cited at the beginning of the relevant volume of the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR). As a result, if the relevant volume of the CFR cited
specific authority, a regulation citing “7805 * * *” could arguably be legislative,
rather than interpretative.215 If so, many of the regulations classified as
interpretative by this Article might actually be legislative. If legislative tax
regulations underwent no change in deference status before and after Mayo
(because they have always received Chevron deference), then including those
covertly legislative regulations in the category of interpretative tax regulations
could introduce additional noise in the regression, attenuating the measured
effect of Mayo on truly interpretative tax regulations. As a result, point estimates
for the magnitude of Mayo’s effects may be underestimates, and the true effect of
Mayo and Chevron might actually be greater.216
One method to test whether the inclusion of three-asterisk regulations has
biased the results is simply to conduct the regressions, excluding three-asterisk
regulations from the treatment group. In these regressions, the main results
presented in this Article—the changes in normative terms, statutory terms,
preamble length, and references to commenters—remained statistically
significant and in most cases increased in magnitude, except that the first-step
regression regarding statutory terms lost statistical significance (although it
remained negative). In general, these results suggest that Treasury may have

214.
These asterisks generally appear when a regulatory document amends an existing regulation. E.g.,
The Solely for Voting Stock Requirement in Certain Corporate Reorganizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,805, 31,806
(May 19, 2000) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); Section 6038—Returns Required With Respect to Controlled
Foreign Partnerships , 67 Fed. Reg. 78,174, 78,175 (Dec. 23, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 602).
215.
Hickman, supra note 86, at 1753 n.99 (noting that she has received this comment, but adding that
the supposed use of the three asterisks to indicate specific authority is “inherently cryptic” and arguing that it
does not satisfy the authority citation requirement of section 553(b)(2) of the APA). See also I.R.S., INTERNAL
REVENUE MANUAL, § 32.1.5.7.4.2, exs. 1, 2 (Aug. 11, 2004) (arguably following this custom, albeit without
explanation).
216.
It is also theoretically possible that the inclusion of the three-asterisk regulations introduces some
sort of omitted variable bias that causes the sign of the effect to be misestimated (e.g., to estimate the causal
effect on normative term frequency as positive rather than negative). As noted further below, this is not
consistent with the data, and moreover it is difficult to imagine why this would be so.
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expected Chevron deference for at least a subset of the three-asterisk regulations
and that the results in this Article, while directionally correct, may actually
underestimate effect size.
Nevertheless, this restricted regression is less reliable because of the
relatively small number of tax regulations that solely cite section 7805 without
including asterisks (30 out of 1084), as well as lingering uncertainty about the
formal meaning of the asterisks and the extent to which this practice complied
with the APA.217 Even assuming that the IRS’s informal signal to the OFR was
internally understood and did comply with the APA, it is unclear which authority
cited in the relevant CFR volume is intended to be picked up by the asterisks. It
appears that many regulations simply cited “Section 7805 * * *” as a matter of
course, making it impossible to determine which were intended to be legislative
and which were intended to be interpretative. Consequently, this Article still
considers three-asterisk regulations to be interpretative for purposes of the main
analysis, but this issue provides additional reason to treat the point estimates in
this Article as lower bounds in magnitude.

E. Descriptive Statistics
The dataset used in this Article includes 467 separate agencies. The number
of regulations per agency is not normally distributed—the most prolific regulator,
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), produced 15,262 regulations during
the time frame studied, around 22% of the total. Additional descriptive statistics
regarding the data and variables are below.

217.
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics on Variables
(1)
Variables
Normative Term Frequency (per
Million Words)
Statutory Term Frequency (per
Million Words)
Legislative History Term
Frequency (per Million Words)
Commenter Term Frequency
(per Million Words)
Preamble Word Count
Regulation Word Count
Reading Level
Democratic Administration

N218

(2)
(3)
Mean Median

(4)
Min

(5)
Max

(6)
σ

69,870 185.8 0

0

35,714 621.5

69,870 107.7 0

0

40,000 703.0

69,870 10.68 0

0

16,129 151.9

69,870 599.0 0

0

36,145 1910

69,956
69,956
69,956
69,956

0
0
-22.21
0

35,245
34,822
61.55
1

1352
735.8
13.2
0.384

765
225
13.4
0

1860
1588
2.138
0.486

Table 11 lists the number of regulations in the dataset per year, as well as a
breakdown of the number of regulations issued by each of the ten most prolific
agencies, which includes the IRS. In order, these agencies are: the FAA, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Coast Guard, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), the IRS, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS).
Note that the number of regulations issued by agencies may not capture
every dimension of the agency’s activities. For example, while the FAA issued
over thirteen times more regulations than the IRS in the period studied in this
Article, FAA preambles are generally shorter, and the word count of those
preambles was only about six times greater at the FAA than the IRS for the same
period.219

218.
N varies because a small number of regulations lack preambles, making it impossible to calculate
term frequency (because the term frequency would be zero divided by zero). These observations are dropped
from the regression analysis when term frequency is used.
219.
FAA preambles had a total of 12,133,693 words, versus 2,018,494 for the IRS.
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Table 11: Number of Regulations for Top 10 Agencies by Regulations
Promulgated, 2000-2020
Year

All

(1)
FAA

(2)
EPA

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Total

3708
3597
3682
3731
3630
3518
3355
3222
3431
3105
3200
3372
3298
3263
3206
2987
3363
3086
3153
2713
2955
69,575

871
783
703
861
905
896
739
755
785
632
711
699
665
763
629
560
683
701
720
507
694
15,262

488
596
526
481
456
471
458
431
462
408
428
461
580
476
495
514
500
550
482
446
412
10,121

(3)
Coast
Guard

(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
NOAA FCC FDA AMS FEMA

(9)
IRS

(10)
APHIS

224
364
405
353
328
301
295
311
285
305
377
445
531
504
482
447
429
507
556
392
201
8042

267
275
269
254
259
279
298
288
322
279
302
284
278
258
287
276
301
279
283
265
294
5897

40
45
54
66
65
71
89
79
81
46
40
61
45
42
60
44
61
21
15
43
48
1116

78
61
90
81
75
59
80
71
46
50
33
43
26
29
32
27
21
15
19
7
11
954

331
309
302
268
277
222
186
101
155
126
95
122
104
124
129
79
79
102
120
85
114
3430

188
120
133
153
163
112
127
130
108
95
86
90
73
68
87
78
116
87
86
47
39
2186

98
65
103
94
85
92
91
87
72
63
60
65
42
70
63
44
60
35
50
52
41
1432

44
51
68
83
81
68
69
78
89
72
98
89
73
54
52
35
30
25
28
23
27
1237

F. Non-Normal Distribution of Term Frequencies
The most common form of regression analysis, ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression, assumes that regression residuals are homoskedastic and normally
distributed.220 However, these assumptions are implausible for the data analyzed
in this Article. The term frequencies described in this Article are (1)
semicontinuous, meaning that they cannot be less than zero with respect to any
text, but can vary continuously above zero; (2) zero-inflated, meaning that there
is a disproportionate quantity of texts that have a term frequency of zero; and (3)
log-normal, meaning that they do not follow a normal distribution even for term
frequencies above zero, although they are normally distributed when log-

220.
Jacob Cohen et al., Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral
Sciences 480 (3d ed. 2003).
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transformed.221 All these features make the assumptions of normally distributed
and homoskedastic residuals unlikely.222
Table 10 shows the problem of zero-inflation by noting that for each of the
term frequencies studied, the median value is zero. The problem can also be seen
in the histograms below, in Figure 13:
Figure 13: Histograms of Dependent Variables, 2000-2020

Figure 13 shows that most of the data are significantly zero-inflated—a
substantial majority of the regulatory preambles have zero uses of statutory,
normative, legislative history, and commenter terms, respectively. (The data are
not zero-inflated with respect to preamble length, however.223) In addition, the
nonzero term frequencies are also not normally distributed—they are log-normal.
The log-normality of the nonzero term frequencies can be demonstrated by
log-transforming them as follows for each term frequency 𝑦:
𝑦h = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑦)

(3)

221.
Preamble length is a count variable, so it is not semicontinuous or zero-inflated, but it is lognormal, as described below, and it cannot be less than zero.
222.
While these distributional features describe the dependent variable and not the residuals, they
affect the distribution of residuals as well—for example, a hard cutoff at zero means that the distribution of
residuals is likely to have a left cutoff with a long right tail.
223.
Unsurprisingly, very few regulations are promulgated without a preamble—86 out of 69,956 in
the sample.

883

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 38:818 2021

After log-transformation, all of the regression dependent variables become
approximately normally distributed, as Figure 14 shows. This motivates the choice
of the log link discussed in Section H of the Appendix.
Figure 14: Logged Histograms of Dependent Variables, 2000-2020

As the following Section describes, two-part regression addresses issues of
semi-continuity, zero-inflation, and log-normality, making it the appropriate
choice of model for the term frequencies in this Article. The preamble length
regressions use a generalized linear model (GLM) that is similarly adapted to lognormally distributed count data.

G. Regression Models: OLS, GLM, and Two-Part Regression
This Article implements a difference-in-differences study through regression
analysis. It takes each rule promulgated between 2000 and 2020 as a separate
observation. In addition to controls, it analyzes three variables of special interest:
(1) a dummy variable coded as 1 if the regulation was promulgated after Mayo
(regardless of agency), and 0 otherwise; (2) a dummy variable coded as 1 if the
regulation was an interpretative tax regulation, and 0 otherwise; and (3) an
interaction variable, generated by multiplying the prior two variables. Five
different dependent variables are studied through the regressions: the term
frequency of statutory, normative, legislative history, and commenter terms, and
the length of regulatory preambles.
The coefficient generated in the regression for the post-Mayo dummy
represents the change after Mayo for regulations other than interpretative tax
regulations. The coefficient for the interpretative tax regulation dummy
represents the difference between interpretative tax regulations and other
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regulations prior to Mayo. And the key variable of interest for purposes of our
study is the interaction term. The coefficient on the interaction term represents
the additional marginal effect that Mayo had specifically on interpretative tax
regulations. The interaction term is therefore the treatment effect or difference in
differences—the difference between interpretative tax regulations and other
regulations, in the differences before and after Mayo.
In addition to the dummy variables and interaction term, subsequent
regressions also include control variables for time trends (piecewise, pre- and
post-Mayo), length of the regulation associated with the preamble, a dummy
variable indicating whether the preamble has a high reading level or a low reading
level,224 a dummy reflecting the party of the sitting president when the regulation
was issued, and dummy variables identifying the type of regulation (rule, notice,
or other225). The basic OLS model is as follows:
𝑦< = 𝛽" + 𝛽A ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$ ∙
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽M ∙
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝜖<

(4)

Controlling for the time trend (separately estimated for the periods before
and after Mayo), the model is:
𝑦< = 𝛽" + 𝛽A ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$ ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽M ∙
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽N ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< + 𝛽% ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝜖<

(5)

Finally, with full controls, the model is:
𝑦< = 𝛽" + 𝛽A ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$ ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< +
𝛽M ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽N ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< +
𝛽% ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽P ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ< +
𝛽R ∙ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙< + 𝛽U ∙ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛< +
𝛽( ∙ 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒< + 𝛽A" ∙ 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒< + 𝜖<

(6)

However, OLS models are problematic for the dataset in this Article, for the
reasons discussed above. Consequently, I instead primarily rely on a GLM (for
the preamble length regression) or a two-part regression model (for the term
frequency regressions). The two-part model has become standard in a variety of
224.
A preamble is designated as having a high reading level if its Coleman-Liau reading level is
greater than 12, meaning reading appropriate for someone with a high school degree or more. The main benefit
of controlling for reading level is that it controls for regulations with trivially short preambles, which have very
low (and sometimes negative) reading levels. Thus, the use of a dummy variable, which captures the variation
of interest in reading level despite relatively low variance in reading level among preambles (the standard
deviation is 2.14).
225.
“Other” documents are not explicitly controlled for, but they form the baseline when a document
is neither a rule nor a notice.
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fields with semicontinuous data that present zero-inflation as well as lognormality.226
A two-part regression model separates estimates of term frequency into two
parts. First, a logit or probit model estimates the likelihood that term frequency
is nonzero.227 Second, an OLS model or GLM estimates term frequency
magnitude conditional on term frequency being nonzero. Intuitively, one could
imagine an agency making an initial decision on whether to conduct statutory (or
normative, or legislative history) analysis at all, and then making a second
separate decision about how much to discuss the statute (or normative concerns,
or legislative history).
For this Article, I use the two-part model developed by Naihua Duan et al.228
and implemented by Federico Belotti et al.229 For the first part, I specify a basic
logit model as follows230:
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡[𝑃(𝑡𝑓< = 0)] = 𝛽"A + 𝛽AA ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$A ∙
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽MA ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝜖<

(7)

The second part of the regression uses a GLM. A GLM is a generalized
version of an OLS model that relaxes some of the assumptions used in OLS
regression, specifically the assumptions of linear functional form and
homoskedasticity.231 The basic GLM is as follows (noting that references to “log”
in this Article are to the natural logarithm, sometimes also denoted “ln”)232:
𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑦< |𝑦< > 0] = 𝛽"$ + 𝛽A$ ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$$ ∙
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽M$ ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝜖<

(8)

226.
Partha Deb & Edward C. Norton, Modeling Health Care Expenditures and Use, 39 ANN. REV.
PUB. HEALTH 489, 495 (2018) (“The health econometrics literature has settled on the two-part model as the
best way to model a dependent variable with a large mass at zero and many positive values.”). For early
examples of the two-part model, see generally J.A. Cole & J.D.F. Sherriff, Some Single- and Multi-Site Models
of Rainfall Within Discrete Time Increments, 17 J. HYDROLOGY 97 (1972) (applying an early version of a twopart regression model to estimate rainfall); Naihua Duan et al., Choosing Between the Sample-Selection Model
and the Multi-Part Model, 2 J. BUS. & ECON STATS. 283 (1984) (applying a two-part model to estimate
healthcare expenditures).
227.
A probit model may also be used. Id. at 496 (“This choice is generally innocuous in that there is
never a substantial difference between logit and probit.”).
228.
Duan et al., supra note 226.
229.
Federico Belotti et al., Twopm: Two-Part Models, 15 STATA J. 3 (2015).
230.
See Yongi Min & Alan Agresti, Random Effect Models for Repeated Measures of Zero-Inflated
Count Data, 5 STATISTICAL MODELLING. 1, 11 (specifying a similar model).
231.
Deb & Norton, supra note 226, at 494-95 (“The GLM generalizes the ordinary linear regression
model by allowing the expectation of the outcome variable to be a function (known as the link function) of the
linear index of covariates, not simply a linear function of the index. Expenditure data, for example, often fit best
with a log link, meaning that the natural logarithm of the expected value of the dependent variable is modeled
as the linear index . . . . In addition, GLMs also explicitly model the heteroskedasticity. GLMs allow the variance
of the outcome to be a function of its predicted value by the choice of an appropriate distribution family.”).
232.
See Min & Agresti, supra note 230, at 11.
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The two models, including time trend controls, are:
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡[𝑃(𝑦< = 0)] = 𝛽"A + 𝛽AA ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$A ∙
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽MA ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽NA ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< + 𝛽%A ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝜖<

(9)

𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑦< |𝑦< > 0] = 𝛽"$ + 𝛽A$ ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< +
𝛽$$ ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽M$ ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽N$ ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< + 𝛽%$ ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝜖<

(10)

Finally, including full controls, the models are:
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡[𝑃(𝑦< = 0)] = 𝛽"A + 𝛽AA ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$A ∙
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽MA ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽NA ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< + 𝛽%A ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< +
𝛽PA ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ< + 𝛽RA ∙ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙< +
A
𝛽UA ∙ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛< + 𝛽(A ∙ 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒< + 𝛽A"
∙ 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒< + 𝜖<

(11)

𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑦< |𝑦< > 0] = 𝛽"$ + 𝛽A$ ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽$$ ∙
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽M$ ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< ∙
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑔< + 𝛽N$ ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< + 𝛽%$ ∙ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟< ∙
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜< + 𝛽P$ ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ< +
𝛽R$ ∙ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙< + 𝛽U$ ∙
$
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛< + 𝛽($ ∙ 𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒< + 𝛽A"
∙ 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒< + 𝜖<

(12)

In addition to the separate estimates of the marginal effect of each
independent variable in the first and second part of the two-part regression, we
can combine the two marginal effects to calculate the overall average marginal
effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable. The formula for
this calculation, of the effect of any independent variable 𝑥< on dependent variable
𝑦< , is233:
𝑦< = 𝑦k< |𝑥< = (𝑝̂ < |𝑥< ) ∙ (𝑦k< |𝑦< > 0, 𝑥< )

(13)

Two-part regression is used for every regression except for the regression
using preamble length as its dependent variable, because preamble length in the
sample is log-normal but not zero-inflated. Consequently, a simple GLM
regression is used for preamble length.
Because the absolute values of changes are difficult to interpret without
understanding average values before and after, this Article also presents semielasticities, reflecting the percentage change in the dependent variable given a
one-unit change in a relevant independent variable. Modifying Equation 13 to

233.

Belotti et al., supra note 229, at 7.

887

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 38:818 2021

calculate semi-elasticities (in order to estimate percentage changes in the
dependent variable):
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑦< ) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑦k< )|𝑥< = (𝑝̂ < |𝑥< ) ∙ (𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑦k< )|𝑦< > 0, 𝑥< )

(14)

Given a retransformed semi-elasticity from Equation 14, a change in the
associated dummy variable from 0 to 1 corresponds to the following percentage
change in the dependent variable234:
100 ∙ (𝑒 m − 1)

(15)

Finally, note that all regressions in this Article, whether OLS, GLM, or twopart, are conducted using standard errors clustered by agency.

H. Choice of GLM Link Function and Distribution Family
Each GLM (whether standalone or second-step) requires explicit
specification of the appropriate link function and distribution family, allowing it
to accurately model non-linearity and heteroskedasticity.235 Although GLM
regression requires additional analysis and is somewhat more computationally
demanding, it is more accurate and will produce better results when OLS
assumptions of normality and homoskedasticity do not hold.
In order to determine the appropriate distribution family for the GLM steps
(and the GLM regression on preamble length), I use a modified Park test. The
modified Park test is conducted using regression means (predicted values) and
residuals from a two-part regression specified using a particular link function
(here, a log link) and a hypothesized distribution family (here, a Poisson or
Gamma distribution). The modified Park test evaluates the manner in which the
square of the regression residuals (the variance) varies with the natural logarithm
of the regression’s predicted values (the mean). If a distribution is homoskedastic,
as is assumed in OLS regression, then there should be no relationship between
variance and mean. A modified Park test uses the following model, where 𝑦k< is
the predicted value from a regression (in the case of two-part regression, the
second part) and ri is the residual from the regression (that is, 𝑟< = 𝑦< − 𝑦o):
n
𝑟< $ = 𝜃< ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦k< ) + 𝜖<

(16)

The model in Equation 16 is evaluated in a GLM regression with parameters
matching the initial hypothesized regression (a log link and either a Gamma or
Poisson distribution family).

234.
Eyal Frank, Log-Linear Regressions: Three Things To Keep In Mind, EYAL FRANK (Aug. 22,
2015), http://www.eyalfrank.com/log-linear-regressions-three-things-to-keep-in-mind [https://perma.cc/735RXJP6].
235.
However, standard GLM only allows us to model heteroskedasticity that itself follows one of
several functional forms: Gaussian, Poisson, Gamma, or Wald (also known as inverse-Gaussian).
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The appropriate distribution family for the GLM regression can be
evaluated based on the estimated value of 𝜃< . If 𝜃< ≈ 0, that implies no
relationship between mean and variance, so that a Gaussian distribution should
be used, as with OLS regression. If 𝜃< ≈ 1, then a Poisson distribution should be
used. If 𝜃< ≈ 2, then a Gamma distribution should be used. And if 𝜃< ≈ 3 then a
Wald distribution (also known as an inverse-Gaussian distribution) should be
used.236 Table 12 shows the results of the modified Park tests and the implied
distribution families. The fact that each regression uses a Gamma distribution
family affirms the choice not to use OLS in the second step of two-part
regression.
Table 12: Results of Modified Park Tests and Distribution Family

Dependent Variable
Normative
Statutory
Legislative History
Preamble Length
Commenter

𝜃<
2.308
2.504
1.884
1.539
1.602

Distribution Family
Gamma
Gamma
Gamma
Gamma
Gamma

Because the non-zero data in this study are log-normal,237 I use a log-link
function (reflected by the log-transformations of the dependent variables in the
equations above. In order to support that the log link was the appropriate choice,
I plot residuals against the linear predictor for each GLM regression.238 If GLM
assumptions are met, then the conditional mean function should be constant
across the residual plot.239

236.
237.
238.
239.

Deb & Norton, supra note 226, at 497.
See supra Appendix Section F.
The trend lines are produced with locally estimated scatterplot smoothing.
JOHN FOX & SANFORD WEISBERG, AN R COMPANION TO APPLIED REGRESSION 320 (2011).
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Figure 15: Residual Plots by GLM Dependent Variable

Figure 15 shows that the conditional means remain roughly constant across
each residual plot, with deviations only at the extremes, driven by outliers. This
supports the use of the log link in each of the GLM regressions and suggests that
OLS regression (which assumes a Gaussian distribution family and an identity
link) would have been inappropriate.

I. Regression Tables
This Section of the Appendix contains full results for the regressions
described in this Article. Note that while many of the key interaction term
coefficients are statistically significant and large in magnitude, the R2 values
(including McFadden’s pseudo-R2, an analogous statistic for logistic and GLM
models that reflects the improvement in the fitted model’s performance over a
naïve baseline model) are relatively low. Intuitively, this means that although
Mayo did have a substantial effect, the model is far from providing perfect
predictions of preamble language. This makes sense: we should expect the actual
substance of any regulation, rather than various summary statistics, to primarily
drive the language chosen for the preamble.
For legibility, some of the tables are divided across two pages, as noted.
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Table 13: OLS Regression Results for Normative and Statutory Terms, 20002020

Variables

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Normative Normative Normative Statutory Statutory Statutory

Post-Mayo

12.70
(26.24)

-32,450*** -38,241**
(9,007)
(15,270)

28.03
(17.69)

8560
(7047)

5713
(7757)

Interpretative Tax
Reg

-73.35*
(37.39)

-69.85*
(37.30)

-134.6***
(34.52)

47.28**
(23.37)

45.97*
(24.05)

22.41
(24.34)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

104.8***
(26.24)

103.4***
(24.42)

104.2***
(26.20)

-77.47*** -76.38*** -82.74***
(17.69)
(17.32)
(15.83)

Year

-9.339**
(4.120)

-8.882**
(4.353)

3.510
(2.786)

3.598
(2.738)

Year x Post-Mayo

16.16***
(4.480)

19.02**
(7.584)

-4.252
(3.507)

-2.841
(3.859)

Regulation
Length

0.0299***
(0.00736)

0.00699**
(0.00287)

High Reading
Level

128.7***
(35.26)

-14.45
(25.18)

Democratic
Administration

28.07
(23.59)

11.02
(9.489)

Constant

181.4***
(37.39)

18,904**
(8,263)

17,826**
(8,739)

91.34***
(23.37)

-6946
(5570)

-7073
(5481)

Fixed Effects

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

N
R2

69,489
0.000

69,489
0.002

69,489
0.017

69,489
0.000

69,489
0.001

69,489
0.002

Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the term frequency of either
normative or statutory terms as the dependent variable, as indicated. Term frequency is
measured in terms per million words. Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Two-Part Regression Results for Normative Terms, 2000-2020
(Part 1, Continued on Next Page)
Variables

(1)
Logit

(2)
GLM

(3)
Avg

(4)
Logit

(5)
GLM

Post-Mayo

0.219*
(0.123)

-0.109**
(0.0519)

0.0680
(0.109)

-43.26
(40.18)

-135.0***
(22.96)

Interpretative Tax Reg

-0.260
(0.305)

-0.300***
(0.0763)

-0.510**
(0.246)

-0.257
(0.310)

-0.307***
(0.0689)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

0.591***
(0.123)

0.199***
(0.0519)

0.676***
(0.126)

0.592***
(0.116)

0.181***
(0.0497)

Year

-0.00784
(0.0187)

-0.0433***
(0.0108)

Year x Post-Mayo

0.0216
(0.0200)

0.0672***
(0.0114)

14.18
(37.39)

93.64***
(21.60)

Regulation Length
High Reading Level
Democratic
Administration
Constant

-1.530***
(0.305)

6.927***
(0.0763)

Fixed Effects

No

No

No

No

No

N

69,489
0.002

69,489
0.003

69,489

69,489
0.002

69,489
0.003

McFadden’s R2

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” and
“GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the
“Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns.
Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Two-Part Regression Results for Normative Terms, 2000-2020
(Part 2, Continued from Previous Page)
(6)
Avg

Variables

(7)
Logit

(8)
GLM

(9)
Avg

Post-Mayo

-169.9***
(40.59)

-51.12
(78.74)

-142.2***
(33.29)

-183.5**
(72.93)

Interpretative Tax Reg

-0.514**
(0.247)

-0.999***
(0.219)

-0.205***
(0.0504)

-1.011***
(0.159)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

0.659***
(0.119)

0.819***
(0.215)

0.204***
(0.0412)

0.864***
(0.212)

Year

-0.0496***
(0.0188)

-0.00626
(0.0225)

-0.0406***
(0.0102)

-0.0456**
(0.0210)

Year x Post-Mayo

0.0846***
(0.0202)

0.0255
(0.0391)

0.0707***
(0.0165)

0.0913**
(0.0362)

Regulation Length

0.000210***
(6.40e-05)

-2.35e-05**
(1.05e-05)

0.000146**
(6.22e-05)

High Reading Level

2.178***
(0.439)

-0.664***
(0.150)

1.092***
(0.287)

Democratic
Administration

0.0753
(0.0968)

0.0612
(0.0496)

0.122
(0.0947)

Constant

8.249
(45.31)

89.18***
(20.39)

Fixed Effects

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

69,489

69,489
0.080

69,489
0.003

69,489

McFadden’s R2

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit”
and “GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while
the “Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both
columns. Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 15: Two-Part Regression Results for Statutory Terms, 2000-2020 (Part
1, Continued on Next Page)
(1)
Logit

(2)
GLM

Post-Mayo

0.437***
(0.147)

-0.128**
(0.0512)

0.268**
(0.134)

7.478
(54.72)

79.92*
(42.98)

Interpretative Tax Reg

0.747**
(0.300)

-0.246*
(0.145)

0.429
(0.327)

0.746**
(0.297)

-0.262*
(0.140)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

-0.467*** -0.288*** -0.710***
(0.147)
(0.0512) (0.134)

-0.466***
(0.149)

-0.272***
(0.0555)

Year

0.00309
(0.0211)

0.0345**
(0.0143)

Year x Post-Mayo

-0.00351
(0.0273)

-0.0399*
(0.0214)

-8.657
(42.35)

-62.05**
(28.71)

Variables

(3)
Avg

(4)
Logit

(5)
GLM

Regulation Length
High Reading Level
Democratic
Administration
Constant

-2.466*** 7.062***
(0.300)
(0.145)

Fixed Effects

No

No

No

No

No

N

69,489
0.007

69,489
0.010

69,489

69,489
0.007

69,489
0.010

McFadden’s R2

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” and
“GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the
“Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns.
Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 15: Two-Part Regression Results for Statutory Terms, 2000-2020 (Part
2, Continued from Previous Page)
(6)
Avg

Variables

(7)
Logit

(8)
GLM

(9)
Avg

Post-Mayo

86.68
(65.60)

-30.99
(82.05)

92.16
(57.65)

64.15
(93.47)

Interpretative Tax Reg

0.412
(0.322)

0.287
(0.184)

0.143
(0.122)

0.402*
(0.212)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

-0.693***
(0.137)

-0.474***
(0.137)

-0.235***
(0.0423)

-0.664***
(0.122)

Year

0.0373
(0.0239)

0.00648
(0.0210)

0.0254
(0.0195)

0.0313
(0.0273)

Year x Post-Mayo

-0.0431
(0.0327)

0.0155
(0.0408)

-0.0459
(0.0287)

-0.0318
(0.0465)

Regulation Length

0.000153***
(3.75e-05)

-7.71e-05***
(1.44e-05)

6.14e-05
(4.06e-05)

High Reading Level

1.584***
(0.274)

-1.578***
(0.225)

-0.147
(0.316)

Democratic
Administration

0.194*
(0.0997)

-0.0773**
(0.0385)

0.0984
(0.0950)

Constant

-17.41
(41.98)

-41.90
(39.28)

Fixed Effects

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

69,489

69,489
0.050

69,489
0.006

69,489

McFadden’s R2

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” and
“GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the
“Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns.
Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 16: OLS Regression Results for Preamble Length and Commenter
Terms, 2000-2020

Variables

(1)
(2)
(3)
Preamble Preamble Preamble

(4)
Commenter

(5)
Commenter

(6)
Commenter

-70,460
(68,175)

-72,120
(56,963)

Post-Mayo

172.1*
(93.12)

20,481
(21,485)

7509
(23,715)

Interpretative
Tax Reg

159.5
(172.2)

152.7
(171.7)

-486.4*** 931.1***
(153.0)
(203.9)

941.2***
(193.0)

642.4***
(218.0)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

411.7***
(93.12)

420.8***
(88.58)

439.7***
(67.73)

194.4
(156.4)

216.6
(169.3)

Year

17.83**
(6.995)

19.51**
(7.844)

-26.96
(32.51)

-28.09
(32.58)

Year x Post-

-10.17
(10.69)

-3.766
(11.79)

35.03
(33.91)

35.86
(28.35)

Mayo

-139.4
(167.4)

202.1
(167.4)

Regulation
Length

0.284***
(0.0285)

0.147***
(0.0249)

High Reading
Level

903.5***
(162.4)

316.6***
(84.75)

Democratic
Administration

92.63***
(28.67)

1.484
(40.87)

Constant

1273***
(172.2)

-34,476** -38,831** 646.7***
(14,062) (15,750) (203.9)

54,701
(65,365)

56,306
(65,384)

Fixed Effects

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

N
R2

69,575
0.003

69,575
0.003

69,575
0.106

69,489
0.006

69,489
0.007

69,489
0.033

Note: Each column reports the results of a regression with the preamble word count
or term frequency of references to commenters as the dependent variable, as indicated.
Term frequency is measured in terms per million words. Standard errors are clustered
by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17: GLM Regression Results for Preamble Length, 2000-2020
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Post-Mayo

0.127*
(0.0739)

18.42
(13.59)

16.88
(17.78)

16.91
(17.78)

Interpretative Tax Reg

0.118
(0.135)

0.118
(0.136)

-0.580***
(0.101)

15.55
(13.47)

Post-Mayo x Interpretative

0.215***
(0.0739)

0.215***
(0.0746)

0.173**
(0.0702)

0.259***
(0.0283)

Year

0.0140**
(0.00618)

0.0161**
(0.00757)

0.0134**
(0.00544)

Year x Post-Mayo

-0.00915
(0.00676)

-0.00840
(0.00884)

-0.00842
(0.00884)

Regulation Length

0.000191*** 0.000191***
(2.77e-05)
(2.78e-05)

High Reading Level

1.178***
(0.185)

1.178***
(0.185)

Democratic Administration

0.0645***
(0.0196)

0.0644***
(0.0196)

Year x Pre-Trend Slope

0.000146
(0.000121)

Constant

7.149***
(0.135)

-20.83*
(12.45)

-26.49*
(15.20)

-26.72*
(15.36)

Fixed Effects

No

No

Yes

Yes

N

69,575
0.009

69,575
0.009

69,575
0.007

69,575
0.007

McFadden’s R2

Note: The dependent variable in each column is the number of words per regulatory
preamble. Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 18: Two-Part Regression Results for Commenter Terms, 2000-2020
(Part 1, Continued on Next Page)
(1)
Logit

Variables

(2)
GLM

(3)
Avg

(4)
Logit

(5)
GLM

Post-Mayo

-0.0359
(0.179)

-0.213*
(0.119)

-0.243
(0.188)

-94.10
(72.31)

-40.05
(36.03)

Interpretative Tax Reg

1.073***
(0.262)

0.124
(0.117)

0.997***
(0.271)

1.084***
(0.248)

0.129
(0.108)

Post-Mayo x Interpretative

-0.0307
(0.179)

0.293**
(0.119)

0.268
(0.189)

-0.0339
(0.166)

0.288***
(0.108)

Year

-0.0248
(0.0337)

-0.0224
(0.0156)

Year x Post-Mayo

0.0468
(0.0360)

0.0199
(0.0179)

48.15
(67.76)

53.12*
(31.30)

Regulation Length
High Reading Level
Democratic Administration
Constant

-1.481***
(0.262)

8.158***
(0.117)

Fixed Effects

No

No

No

No

No

N

69,489
0.004

69,489
0.005

69,489

69,489
0.005

69,489
0.005

McFadden’s R2

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” and
“GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the
“Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns.
Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 18: Two-Part Regression Results for Commenter Terms, 2000-2020
(Part 2, Continued from Previous Page)
(6)
Avg

Variables

(7)
Logit

(8)
GLM

(9)
Avg

Post-Mayo

-116.6*
(67.52)

-85.06
(62.25)

-47.85*
(28.80)

-117.1**
(57.12)

Interpretative Tax Reg

1.010***
(0.258)

0.728***
(0.280)

0.0532
(0.116)

0.646**
(0.272)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

0.260
(0.173)

0.0109
(0.177)

0.298***
(0.111)

0.306*
(0.182)

Year

-0.0426
(0.0311)

-0.0245
(0.0347)

-0.0228
(0.0165)

-0.0428
(0.0323)

Year x Post-Mayo

0.0580*
(0.0336)

0.0423
(0.0310)

0.0238*
(0.0143)

0.0582**
(0.0284)

Regulation Length

0.000184***
(3.10e-05)

2.52e-05**
(1.18e-05)

0.000175***
(2.77e-05)

High Reading Level

1.274***
(0.341)

-0.258***
(0.0889)

0.778**
(0.315)

Democratic
Administration

-0.00995
(0.0570)

0.00466
(0.0652)

-0.00343
(0.0799)

Constant

45.86
(70.10)

53.82
(32.95)

Fixed Effects

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

69,489

69,489
0.060

69,489
0.005

69,489

McFadden’s R2

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” and
“GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the
“Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns.
Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 19: Two-Part Regression Results for Legislative History Terms, 20002020 (Part 1, Continued on Next Page)
(1)
Logit

(2)
GLM

Post-Mayo

-0.263**
(0.104)

-0.169**
(0.0860)

-0.429***
(0.134)

0.0408
(63.01)

30.60
(69.13)

Interpretative Tax
Reg

2.382***
(0.276)

0.435***
(0.0858)

2.783***
(0.292)

2.387***
(0.275)

0.434***
(0.0844)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

-0.222**
(0.104)

-0.0510
(0.0860)

-0.270**
(0.134)

-0.230**
(0.105)

-0.000241
(0.0732)

Year

-0.0121
(0.0185)

-0.0290*
(0.0172)

Year x Post-Mayo

-8.74e-05
(0.0313)

-0.0151
(0.0343)

20.09
(37.16)

64.76*
(34.51)

Variables

(3)
Avg

(4)
Logit

(5)
GLM

Regulation Length
High Reading
Level
Democratic
Administration
Constant

-4.247***
(0.276)

6.602***
(0.0858)

Fixed Effects

No

No

No

No

No

N

69,489
0.034

69,489
0.007

69,489

69,489
0.034

69,489
0.007

McFadden’s R2

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit” and
“GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the
“Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns.
Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 19: Two-Part Regression Results for Legislative History Terms,
2000-2020 (Part 2, Continued from Previous Page)
(6)
Avg

Variables

(7)
Logit

(8)
GLM

(9)
Avg

Post-Mayo

30.64
(92.93)

-15.70
(62.74)

3.150
(52.18)

-12.33
(80.90)

Interpretative Tax
Reg

2.787***
(0.291)

1.959***
(0.230)

0.656***
(0.0712)

2.587***
(0.243)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

-0.227*
(0.127)

-0.261***
(0.0926)

0.0238
(0.0862)

-0.234*
(0.126)

Year

-0.0410
(0.0251)

-0.00399
(0.0153)

-0.0200
(0.0130)

-0.0239
(0.0199)

Year x Post-Mayo

-0.0152
(0.0462)

0.00764
(0.0312)

-0.00155
(0.0259)

0.00598
(0.0402)

Regulation Length

0.000146***
(2.39e-05)

-5.51e-05***
(1.04e-05)

8.93e-05***
(2.59e-05)

High Reading
Level

2.446***
(0.334)

-1.220***
(0.463)

1.191**
(0.569)

Democratic
Administration

0.169*
(0.101)

0.0388
(0.111)

0.205
(0.149)

Constant

0.916
(30.71)

48.25*
(26.13)

Fixed Effects

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

69,489

69,489
0.073

69,489
0.005

69,489

McFadden’s R2

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words. The “Logit”
and “GLM” columns reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while
the “Combined” column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both
columns. Standard errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 20: Shortened-Window Regression Results, 2006-2015 (Part 1,
Continued on Next Page)

Variables

(1)
Normative
Logit

(2)
(3)
Normative Normative
GLM
Avg

(4)
Statutory
Logit

(5)
Statutory
GLM

Post-Mayo

33.05
(86.18)

-73.85
(60.03)

-47.09
(91.79)

27.10
(166.9)

93.22
(100.9)

Interpretative
Tax Reg

-0.949***
(0.261)

-0.235***
(0.0615)

-1.004***
(0.198)

0.375**
(0.180)

0.171
(0.170)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

0.442**
(0.213)

0.134**
(0.0525)

0.493**
(0.197)

-0.947***
(0.202)

-0.242***
(0.0620)

Year

-0.00276
(0.0376)

-0.0237
(0.0285)

-0.0260
(0.0417)

0.0369
(0.0323)

0.0306
(0.0442)

Year x Post-

Mayo

-0.0164
(0.0429)

0.0367
(0.0299)

0.0235
(0.0457)

-0.0133
(0.0830)

-0.0464
(0.0502)

Regulation
Length

0.000209*** -2.29e-05*
(6.81e-05)
(1.29e-05)

0.000146** 0.000167*** -7.43e-05***
(6.61e-05) (3.62e-05)
(1.63e-05)

High Reading
Level

2.215***
(0.418)

-0.557***
(0.156)

1.236***
(0.275)

1.746***
(0.250)

-1.711***
(0.270)

Democratic
0.177**
Administration (0.0804)

-0.0481
(0.0913)

0.0951
(0.109)

-0.0190
(0.148)

-0.104
(0.0882)

Constant

1.212
(75.73)

55.15
(57.18)

-78.33
(64.92)

-51.93
(88.69)

Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

32,424
0.002

32,424

32,424
0.057

32,424
0.006

N

32,424
McFadden’s R2 0.086

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words (except for
preamble length, which measures word count). The “Logit” and “GLM” columns
reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the “Combined”
column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. Standard
errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0
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Table 20: Shortened-Window Regression Results, 2006-2015 (Part 2,
Continued from Previous Page)

Variables

(6)
Statutory
Avg

(7)
Preamble
GLM

(8)
(9)
(10)
Commenter Commenter Commenter
Logit
GLM
Avg

Post-Mayo

117.6
(181.3)

30.76
(28.90)

-136.9
(118.5)

1.388
(49.93)

-111.4
(108.2)

Interpretative
Tax Reg

0.509**
(0.240)

-0.661***
(0.0949)

0.764***
(0.194)

0.130*
(0.0707)

0.759***
(0.187)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

-1.094***
(0.175)

0.113***
(0.0371)

-0.0349
(0.101)

0.188***
(0.0510)

0.159
(0.0981)

Year

0.0637
(0.0531)

0.0139
(0.0129)

-0.0294
(0.0407)

-0.0194
(0.0246)

-0.0437
(0.0413)

Year x Post-

Mayo

-0.0584
(0.0902)

-0.0153
(0.0144)

0.0681
(0.0589)

-0.000730
(0.0248)

0.0554
(0.0538)

Regulation
Length

7.56e-05*
(4.03e-05)

0.000188*** 0.000177*** 1.94e-05
(2.88e-05)
(3.34e-05)
(1.34e-05)

0.000165***
(3.08e-05)

High Reading
Level

-0.140
(0.344)

1.156***
(0.199)

1.073**
(0.452)

-0.175*
(0.105)

0.709*
(0.398)

Democratic
-0.121
Administration (0.160)

0.0373
(0.0403)

-0.0291
(0.0763)

0.130
(0.0808)

0.106
(0.103)

Constant

-21.97
(25.98)

55.99
(82.18)

46.97
(49.26)

Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

32,424

32,439
0.007

32,424
0.056

32,424
0.005

32,424

McFadden’s R2

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words (except for
preamble length, which measures word count). The “Logit” and “GLM” columns
reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the “Combined”
column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. Standard
errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0
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Table 21: Winsorized Regression Results, 2000-2020 (Part 1,
Continued on Next Page)

Variables

(1)
Normative
Logit

(2)
Normative
GLM

(3)
Normative
Avg

(4)
Statutory
Logit

(5)
Statutory
GLM

Post-Mayo

-51.12
(78.74)

-88.93***
(22.53)

-130.2*
(68.68)

-30.99
(82.05)

21.21
(18.32)

Interpretative
Tax Reg

-0.999***
(0.219)

-0.138***
(0.0306)

-0.944***
(0.154)

0.287
(0.184)

0.115**
(0.0491)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

0.819***
(0.215)

0.125***
(0.0329)

0.785***
(0.211)

-0.474***
(0.137)

-0.144***
(0.0190)

Year

-0.00626
(0.0225)

-0.0285***
(0.00630)

-0.0336*
(0.0194)

0.00648
(0.0210)

0.00119
(0.00636)

Year x Post-

Mayo

0.0255
(0.0391)

0.0442***
(0.0112)

0.0648*
(0.0341)

0.0155
(0.0408)

-0.0105
(0.00912)

Regulation
Length

0.000210***
(6.40e-05)

-2.13e-05*** 0.000148**
(4.87e-06) (6.15e-05)

0.000153*** -4.34e-05***
(3.75e-05)
(5.30e-06)

High Reading
Level

2.178***
(0.439)

-0.224***
(0.0627)

1.533***
(0.252)

1.584***
(0.274)

-0.320***
(0.0612)

Democratic
0.0753
Administration (0.0968)

0.00694
(0.0377)

0.0677
(0.0890)

0.194*
(0.0997)

-0.0476***
(0.0185)

Constant

8.249
(45.31)

64.26***
(12.65)

-17.41
(41.98)

4.502
(12.79)

Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

69,489
0.001

69,489

69,489
0.050

69,489
0.001

N

69,489
McFadden’s R2 0.080

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words (except for
preamble length, which measures word count). The “Logit” and “GLM” columns
reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the “Combined”
column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. Standard
errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 21: Winsorized Regression Results, 2000-2020 (Part 2,
Continued from Previous Page)

Variables

(6)
Statutory
Avg

(7)
Preamble
GLM

(8)
(9)
(10)
Commenter Commenter Commenter
Logit
GLM
Avg

Post-Mayo

-6.802
(75.82)

21.65
(17.50)

-85.06
(62.25)

-22.72
(21.75)

-91.94*
(53.90)

Interpretative
Tax Reg

0.374**
(0.180)

-0.494***
(0.0946)

0.728***
(0.280)

0.171*
(0.0885)

0.763***
(0.262)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

-0.573*** 0.140**
(0.116)
(0.0635)

0.0109
(0.177)

0.212***
(0.0683)

0.221
(0.159)

Year

0.00704
(0.0201)

0.0142*
(0.00767)

-0.0245
(0.0347)

-0.0102
(0.00920)

-0.0302
(0.0292)

Year x Post-

Mayo

0.00351
(0.0377)

-0.0108
(0.00870)

0.0423
(0.0310)

0.0113
(0.0108)

0.0457*
(0.0268)

Regulation
Length

9.51e-05** 0.000171*** 0.000184*** 1.83e-05*
(3.83e-05) (2.75e-05)
(3.10e-05)
(9.86e-06)

0.000168***
(2.69e-05)

High Reading
Level

1.111***
(0.230)

1.169***
(0.174)

1.274***
(0.341)

-0.227***
(0.0557)

0.809***
(0.308)

Democratic
Administration

0.128
(0.0888)

0.0490***
(0.0166)

-0.00995
(0.0570)

-0.00998
(0.0485)

-0.0181
(0.0670)

-22.64
(15.37)

45.86
(70.10)

28.37
(18.34)

Constant
Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

69,489

69,575
0.005

69,489
0.060

69,489
0.003

69,489

McFadden’s R2

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words (except for
preamble length, which measures word count). The “Logit” and “GLM” columns
reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the “Combined”
column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. Standard
errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 22: Placebo Regression Results, 2000-2010 (Part 1, Continued
on Next Page)

Variables

(1)
Normative
Logit

(2)
Normative
GLM

(3)
Normative
Avg

(4)
Statutory
Logit

(5)
Statutory
GLM

Post-2005

-41.07
(85.56)

-58.80
(63.48)

-92.60
(94.78)

-137.2
(84.03)

30.40
(83.17)

Interpretative
Tax Reg

-1.045***
(0.213)

-0.155**
(0.0645)

-1.015***
(0.160)

0.103
(0.218)

0.169**
(0.0844)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

0.137
(0.0834)

-0.00545
(0.0663)

0.107
(0.0980)

0.235
(0.144)

0.0269
(0.121)

Year

-0.00413
(0.0302)

-0.0654***
(0.0181)

-0.0688**
(0.0308)

-0.0354
(0.0233)

0.0432**
(0.0186)

Year x Post2005

0.0204
(0.0426)

0.0294
(0.0316)

0.0462
(0.0472)

0.0685
(0.0419)

-0.0152
(0.0414)

Regulation
Length

0.000213*** -3.76e-05*** 0.000138** 0.000170*** -8.66e-05***
(5.77e-05)
(1.16e-05)
(5.61e-05) (3.55e-05)
(1.30e-05)

High Reading
Level

2.024***
(0.432)

-0.792***
(0.164)

0.873***
(0.323)

1.298***
(0.288)

-1.503***
(0.263)

Democratic
0.112
Administration (0.132)

0.0896
(0.0667)

0.182
(0.128)

0.0599
(0.149)

-0.0464
(0.0699)

Constant

3.498
(60.62)

138.9***
(36.28)

66.74
(46.47)

-77.59**
(37.38)

Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

36,514
0.003

36,514

36,514
0.040

36,514
0.006

N

36,514
McFadden’s R2 0.076

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words (except for
preamble length, which measures word count). The “Logit” and “GLM” columns
reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the “Combined” column
reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. Standard errors are
clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 22: Placebo Regression Results, 2000-2010 (Part 2, Continued
from Previous Page)

Variables

(6)
Statutory
Avg

(7)
Preamble
GLM

(8)
(9)
(10)
Commenter Commenter Commenter
Logit
GLM
Avg

Post-2005

-95.89
(114.4)

-8.411
(54.65)

130.0*
(66.54)

171.2*
(97.33)

276.5**
(112.2)

Interpretative
Tax Reg

0.264
(0.220)

-0.534***
(0.102)

0.644*
(0.335)

0.0180
(0.175)

0.539
(0.344)

Post-Mayo x
Interpretative

0.244
(0.178)

-0.162***
(0.0615)

0.110
(0.157)

0.138
(0.113)

0.227
(0.168)

Year

0.0106
(0.0285)

0.0119
(0.0152)

0.0240
(0.0378)

0.0571***
(0.0200)

0.0765**
(0.0372)

Year x Post2005

0.0478
(0.0570)

0.00420
(0.0273)

-0.0649*
(0.0332)

-0.0856*
(0.0486)

-0.138**
(0.0560)

Regulation
Length

6.99e-05* 0.000206*** 0.000192*** 1.97e-05
(3.80e-05) (3.93e-05)
(3.31e-05)
(1.59e-05)

0.000176***
(3.18e-05)

High Reading
Level

-0.308
(0.367)

1.320***
(0.217)

1.397***
(0.254)

-0.352***
(0.0969)

0.779***
(0.265)

Democratic
0.00878
Administration (0.153)

0.0213
(0.0410)

0.0491
(0.0596)

0.154***
(0.0554)

0.194***
(0.0742)

Constant

-18.24
(30.50)

-51.53
(76.33)

-106.4***
(40.24)

Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

36,514

36,597
0.007

36,514
0.062

36,514
0.005

36,514

McFadden’s R2

Note: The dependent variable is measured in terms per million words (except for
preamble length, which measures word count). The “Logit” and “GLM” columns
reflect the first and second part of a two-part regression, while the “Combined”
column reflects the semi-elasticity calculated by combining both columns. Standard
errors are clustered by agency. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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